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ABSTRACT

Cyberterrorism has become one of the most significant
threats to the national and internationalsecurity of the modern
state, and cyberattacks are occurring with increasedfrequency.
The Internet not only makes it easier for terrorists to
communicate, organize terrorist cells, share information, plan
attacks, and recruit others but also is increasinglybeing used to
commit cyberterrorist acts. It is clear that the international
community may only ignore cyberterrorismat its peril.
The primary security threat posed by the Internet is caused
by an inherent weakness in the TCP/IP Protocol, which is the
technology underlying the structure of the Internet and other
similar networks.
This underlying structure enables
cyberterrorists to hack into one system and use it as a
springboard for jumping onto any other network that is also
based on the TCP/IP Protocol. Other threats to national and
internationalsecurity include direct attacks on the Internet and
the use of the Internet as a free source of hacking tools. These
threats will not be eradicatedeasily.
In the absence of feasible prevention, deterrence of
cyberterrorism may be the best alternative. Without, at a
minimum, a concerted effort at deterrence, cyberterrorism will
continue to threaten national and internationalsecurity. The
most feasible way to deter cyberterrorists is to prosecute them
under the internationallaw principle of universal jurisdiction.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is a cold December day, already dark, when Aidan Smith
leaves his office to catch the train home. As he is leaving the
building, the power suddenly cuts out, bringing the elevator he is in
to a screeching halt on the ground floor. He presses the emergency
button, and the doors open, begrudgingly, to let him out. Shaken, he
heads for the train station. As he steps out into the street, he realizes
it is much darker than usual-every building, every street light,
every stoplight is dark. Only the headlights from passing cars light
the sidewalk as he slowly makes his way to the train station. He
finally arrives, but finds that the station is barely lit and is jammed
with people waiting for trains that are not coming. Checking the
news on his BlackBerry, he sees that Washington, D.C., New York,
Chicago, and Los Angeles have simultaneously lost all electricity and
that Al Qaeda replaced the White House website with a message
proclaiming that they have hacked into and shut down these major
power grids to cripple the U.S. economy, as the stock markets,
airports, and banks cannot function without electricity. In short, Al
Qaeda has caused a cyber-apocalypse. 1
Although this situation is hypothetical, the possibility is
disturbingly real. Hackers scan U.S. government computer systems
literally thousands of times a day, looking for a way in.2 In 2001,
hackers successfully attacked an electric power grid in California and
a seaport in Houston;3 more recently, hackers planted malicious
software in the U.S. power grid, oil and gas distribution computer
systems, telecommunications networks, and computer systems of the
financial services industry.4
In March 2007, researchers at the
Department of Energy's Idaho National Laboratory caused a

A cyber-apocalypse is "a cyber attack that could wreak havoc on the nation
1.
by bringing down critical information infrastructures." See BERNADETTE SCHELL &
CLEMENS MARTIN, WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD HACKER DICTIONARY 78-79, 122 (2006)
(explaining that a cyber-apocalypse easily could occur, given the rate at which hackers
attempt to invade critical U.S. infrastructure facilities, and given the demonstrated
weaknesses of those facilities).
2.
Mike Mount, Hackers Stole Data on Pentagon's Newest Fighter Jet,
CNN.coM, Apr. 21, 2009, http://edition.cnn.com/2009/US/04/21/pentagon.hacked/
index.html; see also SCHELL & MARTIN, supra note 1, at 145 (noting that hackers, as
they are commonly known and actually prefer to be called "crackers").
SCHELL & MARTIN, supra note 1, at xxvi.
3.
4.
According to Janet Napolitano, Director of the Department of Homeland
Security, "the vulnerability of the nation's power grid to cyberattacks 'has been
something that the Department of Homeland Security and the energy sector have
known about for years."' Jeanne Meserve, Hackers Reportedly Have Embedded Code in
Power Grid, CNN.COM, Apr. 9, 2009, http://edition.cnn.com/2009/TECH/04/08/
grid.threat/index.html.
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generator to self-destruct, just to see if they could.5 Although these
attacks were narrower in scope and magnitude than the hypothetical
scenario, they each demonstrate the vulnerability of critical U.S.
infrastructure. The fact that each of these critical infrastructure
systems is accessible via the Internet heightens (and arguably
creates) this vulnerability. 6
The Internet has revolutionized and exponentially increased the
threat that terrorism poses to national and international security.
The Internet not only makes it easier for terrorists to communicate,
organize terrorist cells, share information, plan attacks, and recruit
others,7 but also is increasingly being used to commit cyberterrorist
acts. In February 2009, the Director of National Intelligence testified
before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that terrorist
groups have expressed their intent to use cyber attacks against the
United States.8 Indeed, cyberterrorists and hackers attempt to
penetrate Department of Defense computer systems thousands of
times a day. 9
Cyberterrorism has become one of the most significant threats to
the national and international security of the modern state, and
cyberattacks are occurring with increased frequency. Starting on
July 4, 2009, a week-long cyberattack crippled numerous U.S. and
South Korean websites, including those of the U.S. Departments of
Transportation and Treasury; the U.S. Federal Trade Commission;
the South Korean President's Office; the South Korean National
Assembly; and U.S. Forces Korea.' 0 Although the South Korean
government initially believed that North Korea had perpetrated the
attack, security experts later suggested that cyberterrorists operating
in the United Kingdom may have been the source of the attack, which

5.
Duncan B. Hollis, E-War Rules of Engagement, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2007,
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-hollis8octO8,0,5897172.story.
6.
"Internet" and "cyberspace" are general terms that refer to the vast system
of interconnected computers, what is in effect a network of networks. The Internet is
distinct from an intranet, which is essentially a network of computers that are not
connected to the Internet or are separated from the Internet in some way.
7.
See Oscar Schachter, The Decline of the Nation-State and its Implications
for International Law, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 7, 15 (1997) (noting that "new
communication networks have also increased the power of lawless groups").
8.
See Dennis C. Blair, U.S. Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence, Annual Threat
Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on
2
Intelligence 39 (Feb. 12, 2009), http://intelligence.senate.gov/090 12/blair.pdf
("Terrorist groups, including al-Qa'ida, HAMAS, and Hizballah, have expressed the
desire to use cyber means to target the United States.").
Mount, supra note 2.
9.
10.
Martyn Williams, U.K., Not North Korea, Source of DDoS Attacks, Research
Says, COMPUTER WORLD, July 14, 2009, http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/print/
9135492/U.K._notNorthKoreasourceofDDOSattacks-researchersays?taxonomy
Name=Cybercrime+and+Hacking&taxonomyld=82.
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affected hundreds of thousands of personal computers across dozens
of countries."
Estonia was the target of a comparably massive attack from
April to May 2007, when a multi-week wave of cyberattacks
effectively shut down the country by disrupting the websites of the
Estonian President and Parliament,' 2 the vast majority of Estonian
ministries, three of the country's six largest news organizations, and
two of its major banks.13 The attack on Estonia was so effective
partly because Estonia has established an "e-government,"
conducting most of its basic governmental operations via the
Internet.14 For example, Estonians conduct more than 98% of their
banking online,' 5 pay their taxes online, and vote online. 16
Accordingly, these relatively simple attacks effectively brought the
country to a halt for three weeks.
Other significant examples of cyberterrorism in the past few
years include the theft of information regarding the new U.S. military
stealth fighter jet, the hacking into the U.S. Air Force's air traffic
control systems,' 7 and Titan Rain, which is the codename given by

11.
Id.
12.
The attacks seem to have been precipitated by Estonia's removal of the
Bronze Warrior statue, a World War II memorial in Tallinn recognizing Russian
soldiers who died in the war; Estonia moved it because it regarded the statute as
memorializing five decades of Soviet occupation. Tony Halpin, Estonia Accuses Russia
of 'Waging Cyber War," TIMES (London), May 17, 2007, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/
tolInews/world/europe/article 1802959.ece; see also SUSAN W. BRENNER, CYBERTHREATS:
THE EMERGING FAULT LINES OF THE NATION-STATE 1-6, 85-91 (2009) (describing the
attack on Estonia); Duncan Hollis, Why States Need an International Law for
Information Operations, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1023, 1024-1028 (2007) (describing
the cyberattack on Estonia).
See Ian Traynor, Russia Accused of Unleashing Cyberwar to Disable
13.
17,
2007,
at
1,
available at
(London),
May
Estonia, GUARDIAN
the
(discussing
http://www.guardian.com.uk/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia
main targets of the cyber-attack on Estonia).
14.
Id.; see also BRENNER, supra note 12, at 1-6, 85-91 (noting that Estonia
"likes to call itself E-stonia").
15.
See Kenneth Geers, Cyberspace and the Changing Nature of Warfare, SC
Mag., Aug. 27, 2008, http://www.scmagazineus.com/Cyberspace-and-the-changingnature-of-warfare/article/115929/ (noting that internet router attacks were also
conducted on one of Estonia's Internet Service Providers, which is said to have
disrupted government communications).
Michael Cross, Whitehall Must Learn From Estonia's E-Government,
16.
GUARDIAN (London), May 24, 2007, at 6, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
see also Marching Off to Cyberwar,
technology/2007/may/24/society.insideit;
ECONOMIST, Dec. 4, 2008, at 20, available at http://www.economist.com/
(noting that in 2000,
sciencetechnology/tq/displayStory.cfm?storyid=12673385
Estonia's Parliament declared Internet access to be a human right).
These attacks occurred over the past two years, over which time hackers
17.
gained access not only to "data related to the design and electronics systems of the
Joint Striker Fighter" the F-35 Lightning II, but also gained access to the Air Force's
air traffic control systems, as a result of which they "were able to see such information
as the locations of U.S. military aircraft in flight." Mount, supra note 2; see also
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the U.S. government to a series of intelligence-gathering cyberattacks
conducted by a group of Chinese hackers.1 8 Furthermore, these are
only the most publicized of examples-every day cyberterrorists
attempt to undermine national and international security and wreak
havoc in order to further their terrorist agendas. In a single day in
2008, for instance, hackers targeted the Pentagon with six million
attempts to access its computer system.19
These attacks showcase a range of potential tools in the
cyberterrorist's arsenal. Some may be relatively simple and low-tech;
this also means they are relatively easy to deploy. They also
highlight the potential damage that could be caused by more
sophisticated attacks. In fact, cybersecurity has become so important
that traditionally secretive organizations charged with protecting
national security are speaking out about the threat.20 Increasingly, it
is clear that the international community may only ignore
cyberterrorism at its peril.
Roughly defined, cyberterrorism refers to efforts by terrorists to
use the Internet to hijack computer systems, bring down the
international financial system, or commit analogous terrorist actions
in cyberspace. 2 1 The United States has defined cyberterrorism as "a
criminal act conducted with computers and resulting in violence,

Pentagon to Create Cyber-Defense Command, UNITED PRESS INT'L, June 24, 2009,
http://www.upi.com/SecurityIndustry/2009/06/24/Pentagon-to-create-cyber-defensecommand/UPI-79261245853207 (discussing attacks on U.S. computer networks).
18.
See, e.g., Nathan Thornburgh, The Invasion of the Chinese Cyberspies (And
the Man Who Tried to Stop Them), TIME, Aug. 29, 2005, at 34, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1098961,00.html (discussing efforts
to track the Chinese hackers code-named Titan Rain); Nathan Thornburgh, Inside the
Chinese Hack Attack, TIME, Aug. 25, 2005, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/
0,8599,1098371,00.html (discussing assaults on U.S. networks conducted by hackers
based in China). Although these may be considered examples of cybercrime, as opposed
to cyberterrorism, as the distinction lies in the actor's intent which is unknown, they
are just as properly considered examples of cyberterrorism. See BRENNER, supra note
12, at 37-47 (describing cyberterrorism).
19.
Arnaud de Borchgrave, Commentary: Silent Cyberwar, UNITED PRESS INT'L,
Feb. 17, 2009, http:/www.upi.com/EmergingThreats/2009/02/17Commentary-Silentcyberwar/UPI-74141234886723.
20.
James Jay Carafano & Eric Sayers, Outside View: New Cyber-ThreatsPart 1, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Feb. 10, 2009, http://www.upi.com/SecurityIndustry/2009/
02/10/Outside-View-New-cyber-threats-Part- 1[UPI-96861234303408.
U.S. Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell raised this issue for the
first time in February 2008 as part of his testimony on the 2008 Annual Threat
Assessment. When asked if he believed the United States was prepared to deal
with cybersecurity threats to the civilian and military infrastructure,
McConnell noted that the country is 'not prepared to deal with it. The military
is probably the best protected, the federal government is not well protected,
and the private sector is not well protected.'
21.
See SCHELL & MARTIN, supra note 1, at 87 (providing various definitions of
the general term cyberterrorism).
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destruction, or death of its targets in an effort to produce terror with
the purpose of coercing a government to alter its policies," and it
includes attacks on computer networks and transmission lines within
that definition. 22 Put simply, cyberterrorism generally is understood
as any terrorist act conducted in or by means of cyberspace or the
This definition is necessarily broad and includes
Internet.2 3
everything from basic hacking and denial of service attacks to
concerted efforts to unleash weapons of mass distraction or mass
disruption. 24 Such a definition, however, is limited in application
regarding the actor or actors and the intent behind the attack.
First, the term cyberterrorism refers only to terrorist actions
taken by individuals, groups of individuals, or organizations such as
Al Qaeda. To the extent that either a state or its agent was to act in
similar ways,25 it would be considered an act of aggression or use of
force under international law, which may be considered
cyberwarfare. 26
Second, the term cyberterrorism refers only to those actions that
taken
by terrorists with the intent or goal of causing destruction
are
or inciting terror, generally for religious or political purposes,

See id. (noting definitions by the Department of Homeland Security and the
22.
Department of Defense).
BRENNER, supra note 12, at 37 (defining cyberterrorism similarly, as "using
23.
computer technology to engage in terrorist activity.").
See id. at 42-54 (providing a very broad definition of cyberterrorism and
24.
different ways in which cyberterrorism can help terrorists achieve their goals).
25.
The Pentagon estimates that "more than 100 foreign intelligence services
have tried to hack into U.S. networks." Pentagon to Create Cyber-Defense Command,
supra note 17.
26.
Cybercrime as a use of force under international law is, regrettably, beyond
the scope of this article. For treatment of that issue, see, e.g., BRENNER, supra note 12,
at 65-70 (describing cyberwarfare more generally); Geers, supra note 15 (noting that
internet router attacks were also conducted on one of Estonia's Internet Service
Providers, which is said to have disrupted government communications); Michael N.
Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law:
Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 885, 890-99 (1999)
(discussing international laws that govern the use of force and their applicability to
computer network attacks). Parallels to and analysis of Information Operations also
are informative, although cyberterrorism as defined here may or may not fit within the
Information Operations framework, depending on how that framework is defined. Of
course, this presumes that terrorists are rational actors, which may or may not be a
valid assumption. Cyberterrorism may fit within the framework of Information
Operations (10) as defined by Hollis, supra note 12, at 1030 ("10 views these
information networks as both new weapons for use in conflict and new targets for
attack."), but perhaps not within the conception of Information Operations held by Rho
(noting that " 'those activities that governments and military forces undertake to
control and exploit the information environment via the use and the information
component of national power"'). Jennifer J. Rho, Blackbeards of the Twenty-First
Century: Holding CybercriminalsLiable under the Alien Tort Statute, 7 CHI. J. INTL L.
695, 701 (2007) (quoting Daniel T. Kuehl, Information Operations, Information
Warfare, and Computer Network Attack, in COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 35, 37 (Michael N. Schmitt & Brian T. O'Donnell eds., 2002)).
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although financial gain to facilitate further attacks may be a
secondary motivation.2 7 It often is difficult to distinguish cybercrime
from cyberterrorism during an attack, as the key distinction lies in
the intent behind the attack. 28 Depending on his or her goal, a
hacker could just as easily be a cyberterrorist as a cybercriminal.
The primary security threat posed by the Internet involves the
TCP/IP Protocol, the technology underlying the structure of the
Internet and other similar networks. This underlying structure
enables cyberterrorists to hack into one system and use it as a
springboard for jumping onto any other network that is also based on
the TCP/IP Protocol. Other threats to national and international
security include direct attacks on the Internet and the use of the
Internet as a free source of hacking tools.
These threats are not easy to eradicate. One problem underlying
the widespread use of the Internet is the concept of irreversible
dependence on technology: once the benefits of technologies like the
Internet are realized, it is impossible not to use them. The
technologies become an indispensable crutch for those determining
policy strategies, both for foreign policy determinations and daily
governmental operations.
The cyberattacks on the Estonian, U.S., and South Korean
governments, as well as the long list of similar attacks that came
before them, have brought the issue of cyberterrorism prevention
squarely
before
national
governments
and
international
organizations such as NATO, the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union, the United
Nations, and the Council of Europe. 29 These institutions are
beginning to take steps to improve international cooperation to
combat cyberterrorism. 30 The OSCE recently established the Action
Against Terrorism Unit.31
Similarly, NATO established a
Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence in Estonia.3 2 The

27.
See BRENNER, supra note 12, at 41 n.144 (discussing the secondary goals of
cyberterrorists).
Id. at 37-47, 91-94.
28.
29.
See infra notes 32-36 and accompanying text (describing steps taken by
national governments and international organizations in response to cyberterrorism).
30.
It is possible, because of the difficulties in distinguishing cybercrime from
cyberterrorism, that laws aimed at preventing and punishing cybercrime also may be
effective against cyberterrorism.
See Counter-Terrorism Technical Assistance Programmes, Organization for
31.
Security and
Co-operation
in Europe, http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/directory/doal
OSCE.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2010) (discussing the role of the OSCE in combating
terrorism); see also infra Part IV.A.2 (describing counter-terrorism efforts by
international organizations).
32.
See Press Release, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Opens New
Centre of Excellence on Cyber Defence (May 14, 2008), http://www.nato.int/
doculupdate/2008/05-may/e0514a.html (discussing the formal establishment of a
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence to conduct research and training on
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European Union also recently launched the Critical Information
Infrastructure Protection Initiative.38 The United Nations Security
Council and General Assembly have enacted resolutions to address
terrorism or cyberterrorism. 34
Possibly the most significant
enactment is the Council of Europe's enactment of the Convention on
Cybercrime,3 5 which is the first multilateral convention to address
cybercrime.
These domestic and international organizations have made
significant progress merely by taking these preliminary steps, but
more must be done. The international community must recognize
that, as a result of the fundamental insecurities inherent in the
architecture of the Internet, none of these actions will prevent
cyberterrorism completely. Without a complete overhaul (or at least
a significant retrofit) of the very structure of the Internet, these legal,
policy, and technological methods will serve only to mitigate the
potential effects of cyberterrorism.
In the absence of feasible prevention, deterrence of
cyberterrorism may be the best alternative. A longstanding concept
of international law-universal jurisdiction-is one way to deter
cyberterrorism. The likely effect can be seen by drawing analogies to
other international crimes for which universal jurisdiction is
recognized and by applying various rationales for universal
jurisdiction. The borderless and transnational nature of the Internet
and cyberterrorism complicates the application of territorial
jurisdiction.36 The asynchronous pairing of territorial jurisdiction
and borderless cyberterrorism means that territorial jurisdiction

cyber warfare); see also infra Part IV.A.2 (describing counter-terrorism efforts by
international organizations).
33.
See Commission Communication to the European Parliament, the Council,
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on
Critical Information Infrastructure Protection, Protecting Europe From Large Scale
Cyber-Attacks and Disruptions: Enhancing Preparedness,Security and Resilience, at
2-3, COM (2009) 149 final (Mar. 30, 2009) (discussing an initiative to strengthen
critical information infrastructures); see also infra Part IV.A.2 (describing counterterrorism efforts by international organizations).
34.
See infra notes 184-87 (providing examples of resolutions enacted by the
United Nations Security Council and General Assembly).
35.
Convention on Cybercrime, opened for signature Nov. 23, 2001, Eur. T.S.
No. 185, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/185.htm; see
also infra Part IV.A.2 (detailing the requirements and significance of the Convention).
36.
Not all scholars would agree with the characterization of the Internet as
borderless and/or transnational. See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM Wu, WHO CONTROLS
THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD vii-ix (2006) [hereinafter
GOLDSMITH & WU I] ("[T]he Internet ... is conforming to local conditions. The result is
an Internet that differs among nations and regions that are increasingly separated by
walls of bandwidth, language, and filters."); Jack Goldsmith & Timothy Wu, Digital
Borders, LEGAL AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2006, at 40, 40-41 [hereinafter Goldsmith & Wu II]
(discussing the view that the Internet "is splitting apart and reflecting national
borders").
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likely would be a less effective deterrent than universal jurisdiction.
Without, at a minimum, a concerted effort at deterrence,
cyberterrorism will continue to threaten national and international
security.
This Article argues that the most feasible way to
accomplish deterrence is to prosecute cyberterrorists under the
international law principle of universal jurisdiction.
Part II of this Article provides a brief history of the Internet, as
understanding the Internet's origins is important to understanding
the nature and extent of the threat the Internet poses to national and
international security. It also explains cyberterrorism in the context
of the development of intelligence, as viewing the issue in context is
important to understanding the problem of cyberterrorism and its
potential solutions.
Part III of this Article describes the threats to national and
international security that the Internet and cyberterrorism pose and
the ways in which the Internet provides the very tools that
cyberterrorists need. It describes the ramifications of this technology
and argues that, as a result of fundamental insecurities inherent in
the structure of the Internet, it will be impossible to prevent
cyberterrorism in a meaningful way without a major change in the
Internet's structure or its mode of operation.
Part IV of this Article then evaluates various current legal,
policy, and technological methods of preventing cyberterrorism,
including encryption and firewalls on the technological side and
various governmental initiatives on the legal and policy side. Many
of these are still nascent, but none of these legal, policy, or
technological methods can prevent cyberterrorism completely.
Part V of this Article questions whether cyberterrorism-if it
cannot be prevented-can be deterred and whether international law
can provide a meaningful deterrent. It examines whether territorial
jurisdiction would serve as an effective deterrent to cyberterrorism
and determines that, due to the nature of territorial jurisdiction and
of cyberterrorism, territorial jurisdiction would not be an effective
deterrent. It then examines whether universal jurisdiction exists for
prosecuting cyberterrorists under international law, analyzes how
cyberterrorism fits the various rationales for universal jurisdiction,
and draws analogies to other international crimes for which universal
jurisdiction is recognized. It determines that universal jurisdiction is
likely to be the most effective deterrent to cyberterrorism.
This Article concludes that, although the inherent structure of
the Internet is such that cyberterrorism cannot be completely
prevented without massively restructuring the Internet, consistent
and effective prosecution using the principle of universal jurisdiction
may create a sufficient deterrent to cyberterrorism.
Although
deterrence is far from an ideal solution, a layered approach of
defense, deterrence, and mitigation can reduce the threat of
cyberterrorism substantially.
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Examining the history and the technology behind the Internet
and its sister networks is key to understanding the threats to
national and international security that the next Part describes.
Similarly, reviewing the history of intelligence is important to
The
understanding the historical context for cyberterrorism.
similarities and distinctions drawn from those histories and
examined in this Part enable a further understanding of the threats
modern cyberterrorism poses.

A. A BriefHistory of the Internet and Its Sister Networks
Inherent in all communication is a certain measure of insecurity,
which exists in direct proportion to the size and complexity of the
information infrastructure. The Internet demonstrates this most
As a network of networks, the Internet exponentially
clearly.
compounds the problems ordinarily faced by a single network. As a
result of certain technological decisions made during its early days,
the Internet creates major security problems for networks that are
even indirectly linked to it.
The "birth" of the Internet occurred in the late 1960s,37 but
similar systems of interconnected computers had already been in
existence for about ten years. 38 The computer had been created
almost two decades before the Internet, in 1946, when the Electronic
was first
And Calculator (ENIAC)
Integrator
Numerical
3
9
demonstrated at the University of Pennsylvania.
Like the Internet,
the computer had its origins in national defense. 40 Exactly who can

37.
National Science Foundation, NSF and the Birth of the Internet-1960s,
www.nsf.gov/news/special reports/nsf-net/textonly/60s.jsp (last visited Jan. 4, 2010)
(discussing that the Internet was "born" on October 29, 1969 at 10:30 p.m., when the
first message was sent between computers at UCLA and Stanford as part of the
ARPANET, created by the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the U.S. Department
of Defense). But see Susan W. Brenner, Law In An Era of Pervasive Technology, 15
WIDENER L.J. 667, 730-33 (2006) (agreeing that the ARPANET went online in 1969,
but stating that changing the core protocol to TCP/IP in 1983 technically is the birth of
the Internet).
KATIE HAFNER & JOHN MARKOFF, CYBERPUNK: OUTLAWS AND HACKERS ON
38.
THE COMPUTER FRONTIER 277-78 (1991).
See ScoTT MCCARTNEY, ENIAC: THE TRIUMPHS AND TRAGEDIES OF THE
39.

WORLD'S FIRST COMPUTER (1999) (describing the development of the ENIAC computer);
Asaf Goldschmidt & Atsushi Akera, John W. Mauchly and the Development of the
ENIAC Computer, An Exhibition in the Department of Special Collections, Van Pelt
Library, University of Pennsylvania, http://www.library.upenn.edulexhibits/rbm/
mauchly/jwmintro.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2010) (discussing an exhibition in 1996 to
commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the ENIAC computer).
See Daniel F. Burton, Jr., The Brave New Wired World, 106 FOREIGN POL'Y
40.
22, 26 (1997) ("It was designed to calculate firing trajectories for artillery shells."); see
also National Science Foundation, supra note 37 (discussing that, according to common
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take credit for creating the Internet is unclear, as at least three
individuals have been named "the father of the Internet" for their
respective contributions. 41
What is clearer is that it was the
ARPANET, created by the Pentagon's Advanced Research Projects
Agency (ARPA), that ultimately became the world-wide system
known today as the Internet.
TCP/IP, the underlying protocol of the Internet, was adopted as
the core protocol of the ARPANET in 1983.42 In 1984, the National
Science Foundation established connections with most major
universities based on the TCP/IP Protocol. 4 3 Although they had
considered using an international standard being developed called
OSI networking, the TCP/IP Protocol was already developed and
ready, so they adopted it for future use. 44 Because all of the potential
users were known and trusted-indeed, the users of the early
Internet were the designers themselves-security of the protocol was
not a serious concern.45
The end of the Cold War significantly reduced international
tensions and removed any lingering doubts that the U.S. government
might have held about opening the Internet to the American public
and beyond. 46 Thus, in 1988, the National Science Foundation began
to connect other countries to the Internet. 47 In 1991, the first World

belief, the Internet was created as an emergency communication measure to enable the
government to continue to operate in the event of nuclear war).
41.
Those three individuals are: Vinton Cerf, for designing TCP/IP (with Robert
Kahn); Tim Berners-Lee, for conceiving the key protocols of the World Wide Web; and
Paul Baran, for his prior invention of packet switching and routed digital computer
networks survivable under attack. See GOLDSMITH & WU I, supra note 36, at 36-37, 52
(discussing the work of Vinton Cerf and Tim Berners-Lee); George Gilder, Inventing the
Internet Again, 159 FORBES ASAP 106-14 (June 2, 1997) (discussing the work of Paul
Baran).

42.

Barry M. Leiner et al., A Brief History of the Internet: Proving the Ideas,

INTERNET Soc'Y, Dec. 10, 2003, http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml.
43.
See National Science Foundation, NSF and the Birth of the Internet1980s, www.nsf.gov/news/special-reports/nsf-net/textonly/80s.jsp (last visited Jan. 4,
2010) (discussing the development of computers in the 1980s).
44.
See id. (quoting an excerpt from a video transcript of George 0. Strawn's
discussion of OSI networking).
45.
See, e.g., Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV.
1974, 1989-90 (2006) ("[A]buse of the network was of little worry because the people
using it were the very people designing it-a culturally homogenous set of people
bound by their desire to see the network work.").
46.
See National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators 2006,
Overview, S&T: The Global Picture, http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind06/c0/cOs1.htm
(last visited Jan. 4, 2010) ("The demise of the Cold War political order precipitated
more open borders just as the Internet became a tool for unfettered worldwide
information dissemination and communication.").
47.
Guy Basque, Introduction to the Internet, in THE ELECTRONIC
SUPERHIGHWAY: THE SHAPE OF TECHNOLOGY AND LAW TO COME 9 (Ejan Mackaay et al.

eds., 1995). But see SCHELL & MARTIN, supra note 1, at xx (listing 1991 as the key
year). That same year, Robert Tappan Morris, then a graduate student at Cornell
University, unleashed the first Internet worm. Zittrain, supra note 45, at 2003-05.
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Wide Web page launched. 48 Finally, in April 1995, the National
Science Foundation shifted control of the Internet to numerous
private, regional networks. 4 9
Over the past fifteen years, the
accessibility of the Internet has expanded exponentially-once
available only on mainframe and desktop computers, it now is
available on cell phones and handheld devices that are usable in any
location.
Even at the early stages, however, the Internet was not the only
computer network in use. There are multiple computer networks
around the globe that were built using the same fundamental
structure. International banks, federal reserves, intergovernmental
organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and multinational
corporations use many of these sister networks to transfer money and
This interrelationship is quietly
conduct international trade.50
undermining national and international security, including that of
the international financial system. 51
In many ways, the Internet and its sister networks seem new on
the scene. Thus, one might consider that cyberterrorism also is a new
development. In some ways, however, the concepts of intelligence
and of hacking have been around forever.

B. A Brief History of Intelligence
Although cyberterrorism is a relatively new topic of
investigation, the underlying fundamentals have existed for
centuries. In fact, the actions themselves have remained almost
perfectly constant-it is the way in which those actions are executed
and the motivation behind them that have changed.
The most significant aspect of constancy is that cyberterrorism
is, in some ways, merely a new form of intelligence. Intelligence is a
broad term that includes all methods of secret communications and
methods to reveal those secret communications, such as spying,

48.
The first world wide web page was launched on August 6, 1991 by Tim
Berners-Lee. National Science Foundation, NSF and the Birth of the Internet-1990s,
www.nsf.gov/news/special reports/nsf-net/textonly/90s.jsp (last visited Jan. 4, 2010).
49.
See National Science Foundation, A Brief History of NSF and the Internet,
http://www.nsf.gov/news/special-reports/cyber/internet.jsp (last visited Jan. 4, 2010)
(discussing the privatization conducted by the NSF).
50.
See, e.g., 2 JAMES W. CORTADA, THE DIGITAL HAND: How COMPUTERS
CHANGED THE WORK OF AMERICAN FINANCIAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MEDIA AND

ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRIES 37 (2006) (discussing the use of electronic funds transfer
systems in the banking industry); see also Zittrain, supra note 45, at 1975 ("[T]he
Internet has been designed to serve both as a means of establishing a logical network
and as a means of subsuming existing heterogeneous networks while allowing those
networks to function independently-that is, both as a set of building blocks and as the
glue holding the blocks together.")
51.
See Zittrain, supra note 45, at 2003 (discussing the vulnerabilities of a
decentralized Internet).
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counterintelligence, and encryption 52 These concepts are so old that
no one really knows when or where they originated. Many ancient
societies, including those of Ancient Greece and Rome, developed
methods of secret communication.5 3 In the United States, encryption
and other intelligence methods have been used since the days of the
Founding Fathers. 54 Such methods are equally common today,
though they have grown in complexity and acquired the umbrella
term "intelligence."5 5
Signals intelligence is the type of intelligence that is most
relevant with respect to the Internet and strategies for securing the

52.
The term "encryption" refers to one of many possible ways to alter data so
as to make it unintelligible to all but specified individuals. Many such methods
currently exist, in various forms. Encryption methods are generally divided into two
categories: "weak" and "strong." The two terms are rather self-explanatory-"weak"
encryption is easily breakable, whereas "strong" encryption is difficult to solve. There is
an important difference between "key length" and "bit length." A bit is "the most basic
unit of computer data. It stores one of two possible states, represented by 0 or 1." Philip
R. Zimmermann, Cryptography for the Internet, SCl. AM., Oct. 1998, at 110, 112,
available at http://www.philzimmermann.com/docs/SciAmPRZ.pdf. The key is the
sequence of random numbers used to encrypt a block of data, or a given number of bits.
There is a direct correlation between the key size and the difficulty level of cracking the
code. Id.
53.
See, e.g., SIMON SINGH, THE CODE BOOK 8-9 (2000) for a discussion of the
existence of evidence that the Spartans used a system of secret writing called the
scytale in 400 BC. (The scytale is a tool used to encrypt and decrypt messages whereby
a strip of paper, leather, papyrus, etc., is wound around a rod and a message is written
on it. When unwound, the strip of paper, etc., will contain a seemingly meaningless
string of letters, enabling the message to be transmitted secretly. When the recipient
wraps the paper around a rod of the same diameter, however, the message is easily
read. Julius Caesar used a simple letter substitution method in his secret
correspondence, which is now known as a Caesar cipher. Essentially, the alphabet is
shifted by a certain number of letters, which is the key. For example, if the key were 5,
the encoded alphabet used to write the message would be FGHIJ, etc., instead of
ABCDE, etc.). See also JEFFREY HOFFSTEIN ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO
MATHEMATICAL CRYPTOGRAPHY 1-2 (2008) (describing the Caesar cipher); SINGH,

supra,at 48 (also describing use of the Caesar cipher).

54.

See, e.g., Rachel Emma Silverman, Two Centuries On, a Cryptologist Cracks

a Presidential Code, WALL ST. J., July 2, 2009, at A.1, available at
http://online.wsj.comlarticle/SB124648494429082661.html (describing the recent work
of Lawren Smithline to solve a code sent by Robert Patterson to President Thomas
Jefferson in 1801).
See, e.g., CHARLES D. AMERINGER, U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE: THE
55.
SECRET SIDE OF AMERICAN HISTORY (1990) (distinguishing between three types of
intelligence: human intelligence, otherwise known as human espionage or traditional
spying; photographic intelligence; and signals intelligence, including hacking and

encryption.); Norman J.W. Goda, Tracking the Red Orchestra: Allied Intelligence,
Soviet Spies, Nazi Criminals, in RICHARD BREITMAN ET AL., U.S. INTELLIGENCE AND
THE NAZIS 293 (2005) (discussing one example of human intelligence, the Soviet Rote
Kapelle ("Red Orchestra"), a spy network that permeated German-occupied Europe in
the early days of World War II); ROBERT F. KENNEDY, THIRTEEN DAYS: A MEMOIR OF
THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 23-25 (1962) (describing how photographic intelligence was
important in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, when American U-2 spy planes revealed
the locations of Soviet missiles in Cuba).
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Internet.
It encompasses everything related to encoding
communication, either human or electronic. 56 Almost every major
power, including the United States, has used signals intelligence.57
Historically, signals intelligence has played a critical role, especially
on an international level.58 In particular, the concept and practice of
encryption and decryption has long played an integral role in U.S.
foreign policy. For example, President Roosevelt and Secretary of
State Cordell Hull used the IAGIC system of decoding Japanese
communication transmissions during negotiations prior to the
bombing of Pearl Harbor and thus were able to tailor their response
to Japanese actions with the benefit of more complete information.59
In contrast to this aspect of constancy, the methodology and
motivation behind the hacking and codebreaking that underlie
cyberterrorism have changed significantly over time.
First, the
motivation behind such intelligence has changed.
The original
Hacker Ethic was a code of conduct "that championed the free
sharing of information and demanded that hackers never harm the
data they found." 60 That original Hacker Ethic is no longer the norm,
however; cyberterrorism has become a serious threat to national and
international security, as cyberterrorists seek to advance religious or
political agendas. The methods of intelligence are also in transition.
Instead of using Enigma machines, as in World War II, encryption is
increasingly based upon complex mathematics and digital computer
systems. 6 1 As a result, hacking is following suit, incorporating more
technological aspects and fewer quintessentially human skills. 62

56.

See Judson Knight, SIGINT (Signals Intelligence), in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF

ESPIONAGE, INTELLIGENCE, & SECURITY, http://www.espionageinfo.com/Se-Sp/SIGINT-

Signals-Intelligence.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2010) (defining signals intelligence).
57.
See, e.g., id. (describing the joint operation of signals intelligence, in the
form of a communications intercept program, by the United States, United Kingdom,
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand).
58.
The "Berlin Tunnel' of 1955-1956, is an example of signals intelligence
collection. The Berlin Tunnel was a joint wiretap undertaking by the United States and
Great Britain of Soviet and East German communications, in which American and British
intelligence services dug a tunnel below Berlin to tap directly into the telecommunications
cables. See, e.g., Caryn E. Neumann, Berlin Tunnel, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ESPIONAGE,
INTELLIGENCE, & SECURITY, http://www.espionageinfo.com/Ba-Bl/Berlin-Tunnel.htm1 (last
visited Jan. 4, 2010) (describing use of the Berlin Tunnel by American and British
intelligence to collect information from Soviet communications).
59.
(1985).

JONATHAN G. UTLEY, GOING TO WAR WITH JAPAN: 1937-1941, at 145, 151

60.

Stephen Stockwell, We're All Hackers Now: Doing Global Democracy, in

THE ART OF SERIOUS PLAY. THE SERIOUS ART OF PLAY-CURIOSITY, CREATIVITY, CRAFT
AND CONNECTEDNESS IN THE DIGITAL AGE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE CREATEWORLD 08

CONFERENCE 21, 24 (Michael Docherty & Darryl Rosin eds., 2008), available at
http://www.auc.edu.aulmyfiles/uploads/Training/CW08/CW08_Proceedings.pdf.
61.
For the evolution of encryption, see generally SINGH, supra note 53.
62.
See, e.g., infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text (describing the use of
computers to attack websites).
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In fact, intelligence methods actually are becoming less elegant.
Brute force is becoming important in decrypting codes, as teams of
computers, often connected by the Internet, combine forces to attempt
to break the strongest encryption. 63 Cyberterrorists increasingly are
using similar groups of computers and netbots to bombard websites in
denial of service (DOS) attacks, which essentially are attempts to
flood a website with so many requests that the website shuts down.64
Similarly, a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack involves the
use of a large number of malware-infected computers, known as
"zombies" or "bots," to simultaneously visit a website in an effort to
flood the server and overwhelm it, causing it to shut down and deny
access.6 5 In a more advanced DOS or DDoS attack, cyberterrorists
use electromagnetic interference in the form of current or voltage
surges to destroy computer hardware. 66 This type of advanced DOS
attack would be particularly effective against electrical grids and
pipeline systems. 67 Cyberterrorists used the more basic type of DOS

63.
See, e.g., THOMAS CALABRESE, INFORMATION SECURITY INTELLIGENCE:
CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS 266, 485 (2004) (discussing the use of
brute-force attacks to break the encryption of passwords stored on a system).
64.
See, e.g., U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team, National Cyber Alert
System, Cyber Security Tip ST04-015, Understanding Denial of Service Attacks,
http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/tips/STO4-015.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2009).
In a denial-of-service (DoS) attack, an attacker attempts to prevent legitimate
users from accessing information or services. The most common and obvious
type of DoS attack occurs when an attacker 'floods' a network with information.
When you type a URL for a particular web site into your browser, you are
sending a request to that site's computer server to view the page. The server
can only process a certain number of requests at once, so if an attacker
overloads the server with requests, it can't process your request. This is a
'denial of service' because you can't access that site.
See also SCHELL & MARTIN, supra note 1, at 127 (describing the strategy of flooding).
65.
See, e.g., U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team, supra note 64.
In a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack, an attacker may use your
computer to attack another computer. By taking advantage of security
vulnerabilities or weaknesses, an attacker could take control of your computer.
He or she could then force your computer to send huge amounts of data to a
web site or send spam to particular email addresses. The attack is 'distributed'
because the attacker is using multiple computers, including yours, to launch
the denial of service attack.
See also BRENNER, supra note 12, at 1-3 (describing the use of zombie and hot
programs); SCHELL & MARTIN, supra note 1, at 102 (describing the DDoS cyberattack).
66.
See Geers, supra note 15 (explaining that critical infrastructure is
connected to and dependent on the internet).

67.

Tyler Williams, Cyber Security Threats to Pipelines and Refineries,

PIPELINE & GAS J., Nov. 2007, http://www.oildompublishing.com/PGJ/pgjarchivel
Nov07/cyber.pdf.
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and DDoS attacks both against the United States and South Korea
and in the attack against Estonia. 68

III. THE THREATS TO NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY POSED BY INTERNATIONAL DEPENDENCE
ON THE INTERNET

The Internet is arguably the most significant development in the
history of communications because it connects individuals,
institutions, and everything in between to an unprecedented degree.6 9
Dependence on information technology, especially the Internet, is
increasing exponentially on both national and international levels.
Cyberspace affects every aspect of daily life-from the most serious,
such as linking networks of computers that control critical national
infrastructure, 70 such as electric power grids and military
infrastructure, to the most mundane, such as providing people's
primary means of communication through platforms like e-mail,
Facebook, and Twitter.7 ' The Internet has become a global platform

68.
See, e.g., John Sudworth, New "CyberAttacks" Hit South Korea, BBC NEWS,
July 9, 2009, http:/Inews.bbc.co.uk/2/hilasia-pacific/8142282.stm(describing the attacks
against the United States and South Korea). BRENNER, supra note 12, at 1-3 (noting
that an estimated one million zombie computers were used in the attack on Estonia
and further noting that, increasingly, this is a fairly average number).
69.
The National Science Foundation says that "the Internet has changed our
society in ways not seen since the invention of the printing press." National Science
Foundation, supranote 37. Having had a hand in the creation of the Internet, however,
it may be a bit biased.
70.
The U.S. government defines "critical infrastructure" as "systems and
assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to nations that their incapacity or
destruction would have a debilitating impact on national security, national economic
security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters." U.S.
GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CONTINUED FEDERAL EFFORTS ARE NEEDED TO
PROTECT CRITICAL SYSTEMS AND INFORMATION, GAO Doc. No. GAO-09-835T, at 3 n.4

(2009).
71.
See President Barack Obama, Remarks on Securing Our Nation's Cyber
Infrastructure (May 29, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/Remarksby-the-President-on-Securing-Our-Nations-Cyber-Infrastructure/
(arguing
that
cyberspace is the foundation for "the classified military and intelligence networks that
keep us safe"); GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CONTINUED FEDERAL EFFORTS ARE
NEEDED TO PROTECT CRITICAL SYSTEMS AND INFORMATION, GAO Doc. No. GAO-09-

835T (noting the central place that information systems have in American
infrastructure). See also Carafano & Sayers, supra note 20 ("Over the past quartercentury, the cyberspace domain has rapidly expanded to dominate almost every aspect
of human interaction. Americans now depend on cyberspace more than ever to manage
their banking transactions, investments, work and personal communication, shopping,
travel, utilities, news and even social networking."); Hollis, supra note 12, at 1030
(noting the pervasiveness of the Internet).
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for sharing information and for conducting global trade and
investment with few limitations or filters.7 2
Unfortunately, the Internet also has become a global platform for
cyberterrorism, which poses a direct threat to the national security of
all states and, by extension, to international security. The Internet
has become a key tool in terrorists' arsenals. Terrorists use the
Internet to distribute propaganda, recruit and train new followers,
and build and maintain virtual communities of terrorists.73 People
visit terrorist websites that glorify terrorist acts and host virtual
training camps tens of thousands of times per day. 74 The Internet
also enables terrorists to raise and transfer funds and to plan
attacks.75 Most importantly, the Internet provides cyberterrorists
with a new target that arguably is bigger than any physical target.
Without ever having to build a bomb or sacrifice themselves, 76
cyberterrorists can bring down the critical infrastructure of an entire
state, disrupt the global economy, and instill fear and chaos among
billions of people.
These threats are not new, however, nor are the government's
attempts to recognize and respond to them. Almost from the moment
the Internet became available to the public, the U.S. government
recognized the importance of information networks and their
potential to yield disastrous consequences. The White Paper on
Information Infrastructure Assurance of December 1995 recognized
that critical U.S. infrastructures such as the banking, credit, and
Federal Reserve systems, and the stock exchanges each depend
heavily on information networks like the Internet that are vulnerable
to network-based attacks.7 7 That same White Paper estimated that
(admittedly underreported) U.S. business losses from cybercrimes

72.
And, as will be discussed, disturbingly little security. Carafano & Sayers,
supra note 20.
73.
Raphael F. Perl, Head, Action Against Terrorism Unit, Org. for Sec. &
Coop'n in Eur., Terrorist Use of the Internet: Threat, Issues, and Options for
International Cooperation, Remarks at the Second International Forum on Information
Security 2 (Apr. 7-10, 2008), available at http://www.osce.org/documents/cio/2008/04/
30594_en.pdf.
74.
Id.
Id.
75.
It should be noted that some terrorists may be deterred from
76.
cyberterrorism specifically because it does not offer the opportunity for self-sacrifice
and, therefore, martyrdom. Regardless, the threat of cyberterrorism remains severe, as
demonstrated by incidents to date. Furthermore, prosecution under universal
jurisdiction may have an even stronger deterrent effect on those motivated by
martyrdom, as the cyberterrorist likely will have few such opportunities while in
prison. But see Bradley K. Ashley, Anatomy of Cyberterrorism: Is America Vulnerable?
22 (Feb. 27, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the U.S. Air Force), available
at http://www.au.af.millaulawc/awcgate/awc/ashley.pdf (arguing that the absence of
suicide missions is one incentive of sustained cyberterror operations).
U.S. SEC. POLICY BD., FED'N OF AM. SCIENTISTS, WHITE PAPER ON INFORMATION
77.
INFRASTRUCTURE ASSURANCE (1995), http://www.fas.org/sgp/spb/whitepap.html.
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totaled $5 billion in 1995.78 As a result, the Clinton administration
created the Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure
Protection and the Presidential Information Technology Advisory
Council, among other similar committees.7 9
The second Bush administration also took several actions
against cyberterrorism. Former President George W. Bush created
the Department of Homeland Security, which was tasked with
(among other things) cybersecurity. 80 In February 2003, the White
House released the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, which
was intended to "provide[] a framework for protecting this
infrastructure that is essential to our economy, security, and way of
life."8 1 Little from the National Strategy was implemented, however,
in part because the administration could not agree on how to
structure the authorization to do so and in part because it was
determined that the administration did not have sufficient credibility
On January 8, 2008, the Bush
or political capital to do so. 8 2

78.

Id. Those, of course, were the halcyon days; losses today are exponentially

higher. See Digital Warriors: Professor Pens Book About The New BattlefieldCyberspace, REUTERS, Apr. 23, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/
idUS181528+23-Apr-2009+PRN20090423.
'In 2004, the Federal Bureau of Investigation estimated that cybercrime cost
U.S. citizens about $400 billion, and in July 2007 FBI Director Robert Mueller
said he believes only about one-third of cybercrime in the U.S. is actually
reported to the FBI,' Brenner said. 'I have heard cybercrime estimates are
much, much higher than the figure cited for 2004 .... It will continue to
increase until governments begin to create realistic disincentives for
cybercriminals.'
U.S. Department of Justice, Computer Crime and Intellectual Property
79.
Section (CCIPS), Critical Infrastructure Protection, http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/
cybercrime/critinfr.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2009).
See generally Exec. Order No. 13,228, 66 Fed. Reg. 51,812 (Oct. 10, 2001)
80.
(establishing the Office of Homeland Security and charging the organization with
protection of information systems); Exec. Order No. 13,260, 67 Fed. Reg. 13,241 (Mar.
21, 2002) (providing for implementation of information security measures); Homeland
Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002) (creating the
department). The National Cybersecurity Division of the Office of Cybersecurity and
Communications "works collaboratively with public, private and international entities
to secure cyberspace and America's cyber assets." U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, National Cybersecurity Division, Mission, http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/
structure/editorial 0839.shtm (last visited Jan. 4, 2010).
THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBERSPACE 4 (2003),
81.
availableat http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/National Cyberspace_-Strategy.pdf.
David E. Sanger, John Markoff & Thom Shanker, U.S. Steps Up Effort on
82.
available at
2009, at Al,
27,
Apr.
Digital Defenses, N.Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/28/us/28cyber.html. Indeed, the Cyberspace Policy
Review published by the Obama administration recognizes up front that the United
States still "needs a strategy for cybersecurity designed to shape the international
environment and bring like-minded nations together on a host of issues, such as
technical standards and acceptable legal norms regarding territorial jurisdiction,
sovereign responsibility, and the use of force." THE WHITE HOUSE, CYBERSPACE POLICY
REVIEW: ASSURING A TRUSTED AND RESILIENT INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
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National
Comprehensive
the
established
administration
Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) through Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 23 and National Security Presidential
The CNCI was an effort to identify current and
Directive 54.83
emerging cyber threats, protect vulnerable infrastructure, and
determine how to respond to cybercriminals.8 4
The Obama administration has acknowledged, perhaps more
adroitly than the previous administrations, the threat that
cyberterrorism poses to U.S. and global infrastructures. As President
Obama said, cybersecurity is
a matter of public safety and national security. We count on computer
networks to deliver our oil and gas, our power and our water. We rely
on them for public transportation and air traffic control. Yet we know
that intruders have probed our electrical grid and that, in other
countries, cyber attacks have plunged entire cities into darkness. Our
technical advantage is a key to America's military dominance. But our
defense and military networks are under constant attack. Al Qaeda
and other terrorist groups have spoken of their desire to unleash a
cyber attack on our country-attacks that are harder to detect and
harder to defend against. Indeed, in today's world, acts of terror could
come not only from a few extremists in suicide vests but from a few
85
keystrokes on the computer-a weapon of mass disruption.

Similarly, the head of the National Security Agency, Lieutenant
General Keith Alexander, described cyberspace as "the new national
security frontier."8 6
These critical infrastructures, and all who depend upon them,
are plagued by a very serious problem: these technological media are
historically insecure. The combination of the world's dependence on
technology with the fallibility of such systems has profound effects on
the state of national and international security. As global financial
markets increasingly rely upon information technology to operate on

INFRASTRUCTURE iv (2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/
CyberspacePolicyReview-final.pdf.
Each of those Presidential Directives is classified. See JOHN ROLLINS &
83.
ANNA C. HENNING, COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY INITIATIVE: LEGAL
AUTHORITIES AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. Doc. No. R40427,
at 1 (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natseclR40427.pdf ("The Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 23 and National Security Presidential Directive 54
establishing the CNCI are classified."). See also Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Homeland
Sec., Fact Sheet: Protecting Our Federal Networks Against Cyber Attacks, Apr. 8,
2008, http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1207684277498.shtm (stating that the
directive formalized continuing efforts to protect federal information systems from
attack).
ROLLINS & HENNING, supra note 83, at 2.
84.
85.
President Barack Obama, supra note 71. See also Obama Creates Top Job

for Guarding Online Security: Speech by U.S. PresidentBarack Obama (CNN Internet
broadcast May 29, 2009), available at http://edition.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/05/29/
cyber.czar.obama/index.html#cnnSTCVideo (detailing the threat of cyber terrorism).

86.

Pentagon to Create Cyber-Defense Command, supra note 17.

2010/

DETERRING CYBERTERRORISM

77

even the most basic level, their interconnectedness and vulnerability
are becoming ever more salient.8 7
As will be explained in detail, the Internet poses a three-pronged
The clearest
threat to national and international security.
manifestation of this threat is the capacity to exploit an inherent
weakness in the structure of the Internet to "island-hop," or jump
from computer to computer and network to network, accessing more
critical data and more vulnerable networks.88 This easily can be
accomplished once an attacker has "spoofed" his or her way onto a
network.8 9 As a result of the structure of the Internet and related
networks, cyberterrorists can gain access to systems and networks
that are not necessarily considered vulnerable. Second, the Internet
is utterly incapable of protecting information from sufficiently
persistent and knowledgeable cyberterrorists. Finally, the Internet
provides cyberterrorists with the tools that they need to carry out
direct attacks on the Internet and use the Internet as a springboard
to attack other networks.
In fact, the insecurity of the Internet and its sister networks is
such that a cyberterrorist with enough knowledge and the right tools
can bring the entire system crashing down.90 This looming danger is
related to the very accessibility that makes the Internet revolutionary
because, increasingly, key aspects of critical public infrastructure are
connected or accessible via the Internet. In the United States,
"[v]irtually all federal operations are supported by computer systems
and electronic data, and agencies would find it difficult, if not
impossible, to carry out their missions, deliver services to the public,

Diffie and Landau explain the trend toward an increasing dependency on
87.
information technology for conducting business:
The rising importance of intellectual property has expanded the role of
electronic communications in business . . . A larger and larger fraction of our
commerce is in information, so delivery of goods and services by electronic
media is becoming more and more common. To support this delivery, the media
themselves are becoming more unified, (which is) commonly referred to as the
development of a 'Global Information Infrastructure.'
WHITFIELD DIFFIE & SUSAN LANDAU,
WIRETAPPING AND ENCRYPTION 5 (1998).

PRIVACY

ON THE LINE: THE POLITICS OF

This is discussed in greater detail in Part IV.A infra.
88.
Spoofing is defined as the "appropriation of an authentic user's identity by
89.
non-authentic users, causing fraud or attempted fraud, in some cases, and causing
critical infrastructure breakdowns in other cases. Spoofing can also target nonuserbased entities. For instance, an IP address can be spoofed to appropriate the identity of
a server and not a human (user)." SCHELL & MARTIN, supranote 1, at 298.
90.
For a more technical explanation of the fundamental insecurity than is
provided in this article, see generally Steven T. Bellovin, A Look Back at "Security
Problems in the TCP/IP Protocol Suite," Dec. 2004, http://www.cs.columbia.edul-smb/
papers/ipext.pdf (outlining the vulnerabilities of TCP interfacing).
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and account for their resources without these cyber assets." 9 ' As a
result, ineffective security controls can expose a broad array of
government operations and assets to significant risk, including the
threat that critical infrastructure could be disabled. 92 Ironically, the
necessary knowledge and tools are readily available on the Internet.
There is no good outcome to cyberterrorist attacks. The bestcase scenario would involve damage limited to bad publicity and
international embarrassment because government websites were
hacked. The seemingly inevitable worst-case scenario includes the
theft of classified information, the collapse of the international
financial system, major breaches of national and international
security and, potentially, war.9 3
A. Jumpingfrom Network to Network - The Fundamental
Insecurity of the TCP/IPProtocol
The first and most glaring threat is the fundamental lack of
security incorporated into the TCP/IP Protocol suite, the structure
upon which the Internet is based. The TCP/IP Protocol essentially
serves as the "language" of cyberspace-it is the technology by which
information moves from computer to computer and server to server. 94
When the Internet was born at the height of the Cold War, only
divisions of the government had access to the system.95 As a result,
the early Internet did not need to be secure; indeed, by being
connected to the system, a computer was presumed to be secure. 96
The only goal was to make communication between those government
agencies as easy and as immediate as possible. As a result, the very
framework on which the Internet is built, the TCP/IP Protocol, is
inherently insecure.9 7
The primary insecurity of the TCP/IP Protocol is that it allows
access to other networks also based on the TCP/IP Protocol. This
insecurity opens the Internet, and any network or computer

91.
GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CONTINUED FEDERAL EFFORTS ARE
NEEDED TO PROTECT CRITICAL SYSTEMS AND INFORMATION, GAO Doc. No. GAO-09835T, at 2 (2009).
Id.
92.
93.
Some might say that this position is naive, that we already are in a state of
information warfare, and that of course many of the attacks come from foreign
governments. See generally DOROTHY DENNING, INFORMATION WARFARE & SECURITY
62-76 (1999) (chronicling the current uses of information warfare in state-sponsored
international conflict). Although this may be true from a policy perspective, from a
legal perspective an act of aggression or use of force has significant consequences.
94.
Id. at 16.
95.
National Science Foundation, supra note 37.
96.
See HAFNER & MARKOFF, supra note 38, at 278-79 (portraying the early
Arpanet as an intimate and insular community of elite scientists).
97.
SCHELL & MARTIN, supra note 1, at 311 (noting that the TCP/IP Protocol is
"known for its lack of security on many of its layers").
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connected to it, to a number of security threats that cannot be solved
with encryption alone.9 8 The TCP/IP Protocol operates by a sequence
of communications between the sending computer or network and the
receiving computer or network, known as a "three-way handshake."9 9
Essentially, Computer 1 tells Computer 2 that it wants to
Computer 2 responds that it is willing to
communicate.
Computer 1 then sends Computer 2 a message
communicate.
confirming that they are going to communicate. 0 0
Theoretically, this process must be followed completely in order
to open a connection, but there is a process error in the way TCP
operates. "If two connections are opened in a short time, many TCP
stacks pick the initial sequence number for the second connection by
10
adding some constant to the sequence number used for the first." '
An attacker can easily exploit this common system error, especially if
he or she has already spoofed (i.e., faked) a user's login name and
password and can thus use them to open a legitimate connection to
the network. Once that connection is open, he or she can note the
sequence number used and then use it to send the third message to
the network and open a new, anonymous connection whereby he or
she can attack undetected. 0 2 The attacker can then jump, not only
from computer to computer, but from network to network, which is
known as "island-hopping." 0 3 With determination and a bit of luck,
the criminal can find a "back-door" into a network and cause
04
significant damage, especially if his or her actions go undetected.1
This type of springboard attack is possible with any network based on
the TCP/IP Protocol.' 0 5 Thus, networks that are thought to be

The U.S. government recognizes this insecurity. See, e.g., GAO Doc. No.
98.
GAO-09-835T, supra note 70, at 2 ("Computer resources could be used for unauthorized
purposes to launch attacks on other computer systems.")
See SCHELL & MARTIN, supra note 1, at 319-20 (describing the operations
99.
of TCP/IP Protocol).
See id. (using "Alice" as Computer 1 and "Bob" as Computer 2).
100.
Steve Bellovin, Network and Internet Security, in INTERNET BESEIGED:
101.
COUNTERING CYBERSPACE SCOFFLAWS 117, 122 (Dorothy E. Denning & Peter J.
Denning eds., 1997).
Id.
102.
103.
SCHELL & MARTIN, supra note 1, at 183-84 (defining "island-hopping" as
"crack[ing] one system and then us[ing] it as a 'launching pad' for cracking other
systems").
Id.
104.
105.
See U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team, National Cyber Alert
System, Technical Cyber Security Alert TAO4-111A, Vulnerabilities in TCP,
("Since the TCPIP Initial
http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/techalerts/TA04-111A.html
Sequence Number vulnerability (VU#498440) has been proven more viable of an
attack, any services or sites that rely on persistent TCP sessions could also be affected
by this vulnerability.") (last visited Jan. 4, 2010); John McCormick, TCP Reset Spoofing
a Serious Flaw With Routers: Protect Yourself, TECH. REPUBLIC, May 3, 2004,
(noting the vast
http://articles.techrepublic.com.com./5100-10878_11-5201771.html
extent of TCP vulnerability).
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separate and therefore secure because they are not connected to the
Internet may not be as safe as originally thought.
The infamous 1994 infiltration of the Citibank system by
Russian hackers who penetrated the Citicorp electronic banking
system used by corporate customers for electronic funds transfers
illustrates the feasibility of this springboard tactic. 0 6
Having
somehow acquired the proper authorization, the hackers obtained the
identification numbers and passwords for the accounts of three
banks.10 7 They then dialed into Citicorp's network from an office in
St. Petersburg and transferred over $10 million to their own
accounts.1 08 Similarly, in 1995 and 1996, an attacker from Argentina
hacked into a U.S. university system and used that as a springboard
to computer networks at the Naval Research Laboratory, NASA, and
Los Alamos National Laboratory that contained sensitive research
information regarding weapons and command and control systems. 10 9
Though these may not have been considered examples of
cyberterrorism, it is easy to see how these actions could be taken for
the purpose of destabilizing governments and/or the international
financial system.
This ability to use the Internet as a springboard creates an
entirely different type of problem. Protecting one company's network
and the information therein is in and of itself an extremely difficult
task; protecting the entire Internet and the myriad of networks that
may or may not be connected to it is much more complex. Indeed, as
the most salient problems lie in the very design and foundation of the
Internet itself, such problems are almost impossible to solve. This
threat is severe and significantly worse than most people realize.

B. Direct Attacks on the Internet
The Internet's second major insecurity is that, due to its
inherently insecure structure, it is vulnerable not just as a
springboard for jumping from network to network but to other types
of cyberattacks as well. Cyberterrorists can attack the Internet itself
using DOS or DDoS attacks, shutting down critical infrastructure or
launching any number of other attacks.1 10 Although encryption has
long been touted as the blanket solution to the security of the

106.
DENNING, supra note 93, at 55-56.
107.
Id.
108.
Id.
109.
U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INFORMATION SECURITY-COMPUTER
ATTACKS AT DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POSE INCREASING RISKS, GAO Doc. No.
GAO/AIMD-96-84, at 25 (1996).
See generally Richard Garnett & Paul Clarke, Cyberterrorism: A New
110.
Challenge for International Law, in ANDREA BIANCHI & YASMIN NAQVI, ENFORCING
INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS AGAINST TERRORISM 465 (2004) (describing various ways
terrorists target the internet).
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Internet, even strong encryption is inadequate to solve such a
complex problem.' 1 Many types of attacks still can be carried out,
including eavesdropping, password sniffing, data modification, Trojan
horses,112 and spoofing. Although some of these types of attacks have
been longstanding, such as eavesdropping, spoofing, and Trojan
horses, they remain relevant: for example, Trojan horses were used in
the Titan Rain attacks.1 13 Encryption alone has not eliminated these
grave threats.1 14
"Eavesdropping" is exactly what it sounds like: a third party
"listens in" on the communications of two parties with neither the
knowledge nor the consent of either party.115 This is usually done
with a packet sniffer,11 6 which is a program for monitoring network
packets of information that come to and from a particular computer.
Usually, a computer on a local-area network (LAN) will only receive
packets of information that are addressed specifically to it, but with
some LAN technologies, it is possible to operate the modem, router, or
other network interface in "promiscuous mode,"1 17 which allows the
computer to receive all incoming information, regardless of whether
or not it is properly addressed to that computer."i 8
Password sniffing is also done with a packet sniffer, but whereas
the goal of eavesdropping is to gain access to particular information,
the goal of password sniffing is to acquire log-in names and
passwords that can be used to gain direct access to other
computers.' 1 9 This can be even more dangerous, because by using
this login information, a cyberterrorist not only has access to all files
on that computer but also would have access to the entire network to
which that computer belongs.
Both eavesdropping and password sniffing are relatively lowlevel attacks, in that they attempt to gain access to information but
not to modify it. Data modification, also known as tampering, is the
unauthorized modification of data or software on a computer or
network.120 Attacks of this type are particularly serious when the
perpetrator is able to obtain root access to the network, which gives
the attacker the power to issue any command and to alter or delete
any information on the system. 121 This can result not only in

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
interface").
118.
119.
120.
121.

DENNING, supra note 93, at 309-10.
See SCHELL & IVIARTIN, supra note 2, at 328-29 (defining "Trojans").
Carafano & Sayers, supra note 20.
DENNING, supra note 93, at 309-10.
See SCHELL & MARTIN, supra note 1, at 107 (defining "eavesdropping").
See id. at 292 (defining "packet sniffer").
See id. at 255-56 (defining and describing "promiscuous mode network
Id.
DENNING, supra note 93, at 184.
Id. at 151.
See SCHELL & MARTIN, supra note 1, at 273 (defining "root").
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information being changed, such as the destination account number
for an electronic funds transfer, but also in computer or network
shut-down, such as a major electricity grid. Due to the availability of
specialized hacking tools, obtaining root access to a system, and
therefore affecting critical infrastructure, is relatively easy.
Spoofing attacks are concentrated on impersonating a particular
user or computer, usually in order to launch other types of attacks.12 2
Spoofing is often committed in connection with password sniffing;
after obtaining a user's log-in and password, the spoofer will log in to
the computer and masquerade as the legitimate user.
The
cyberterrorist typically does not stop there, instead using that
computer as a bridge to another, hopping in this fashion from
computer to computer. This process, called "looping," effectively
conceals the spoofer's identity, especially because he or she may have
jumped back and forth across various national boundaries. 123
Even more disturbing is the possibility of misleading entire
governments into believing that another, potentially hostile
government is attempting to infiltrate its networks. Imagine that a
cyberterrorist perpetrates an attack on the network maintained by
the U.S. Treasury and steals millions of dollars, transferring the
money to his own account to be used for funding further terrorist
activities. 124 He has used the spoofing technique, however, which
causes the U.S. government to believe the Russian government to be
behind the attack and to accuse them of the attack. The Russian
government denies the accusation and is insulted at the seemingly
unprovoked hostility. Tensions between the governments escalate
and boil over, potentially resulting in war. Though this may be only a
hypothetical example, it is frighteningly plausible. In fact, it may
have been used in the attacks on U.S. and South Korean websitesthe South Korean government initially was so certain that North
Korea was behind the attack that it publicly accused the North
Korean government, despite already tense relations.' 2 5 Similarly, in
the 2007 attack on Estonia, Estonian authorities were so certain that
the Russian government was behind the attack that they not only
publicly accused them but requested military assistance from NATO
in responding to the attack. 126 It was later determined that Russia
was not behind the attack and that at least some of the attackers
were located in Brazil and Vietnam.' 2 7

122.
See id. at 298 (defining "spoofing").
123.
DENNING, supra note 93, at 218.
124.
See BRENNER, supra note 12, at 41 n.144 (noting that terrorists have
secondary financial agendas).
125.
See, e.g., Williams, supra note 10 (illustrating the confusion felt by
American officials when tracing hackers who used looping techniques).
126.
BRENNER, supranote 12, at 133.
127.
BRENNER, supra note 12, at 5-6, 133.
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Another possibility exists, however, which is even more
disturbing due to its more subversive nature. In the previous
example, only certain actors' identities were altered.
Imagine,
however, that the attacker presents the victim with an alternative
version of the entire Internet, tricking the victim into using the false
interface without knowing that he or she is giving his or her attacker
valuable information, such as log-in names, passwords, and account
numbers. Researchers at Princeton University have shown how the
entire Internet can be spoofed by intercepting all web traffic to and
from a victim, showing the victim an edited version, and squirreling
away the victim's passwords. 128 Encryption actually harms the
victim in this situation because it effectively establishes a secure
channel to the attacker's computer.12 9 As described by Professor
Susan Brenner, cyberterrorists could then use the false website to
make bomb threats of other similarly disruptive threats, causing
evacuation of entire cities; mass chaos; potential death and
destruction; and almost certain erosion of public confidence in the
government, without even having to build a bomb. 130

C. The Internet As Hacker's Toolbox
The third way the Internet threatens national and international
security is its use as a resource to find and acquire the tools needed to
attack separate networks. The Internet essentially functions as a
free, communal toolbox, providing hackers and cyberterrorists with
software, commands, and other tools. 131 In fact, many of the
programs used to locate and exploit the vulnerabilities of a particular
computer or network are available free for download from publicly
accessible websites and require little technical knowledge to
implement.13 2 Simply putting "hacker tools" into any search engine
yields thousands of websites ready to provide the information.1 3 3
Thus, not only are transactions, research, and other actions taken
through the Internet insecure, but the Internet provides the very
keys used to commit acts of cyberterrorism.

128.
DENNING, supra note 93, at 265.
129.
Id.
130.
See BRENNER, supra note 12, at 46-47 (describing such a potential attack
on the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit system).
131.
DENNING, supranote 93, at 206-7.
132.
Id. See also Carolyn Meinel, Appendix A- How Do Hackers Break Into
Computers?, in SCHELL & MARTIN, supra note 2, at 373, 373-80 (discussing various
ways that hackers break into computers).
133.
When the Author ran this search in Google, it yielded approximately
44,900,000 results.
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D. The ParticularVulnerability of Networks in the
InternationalFinancialSystem
Threats to the international financial system constitute one of
the more serious threats posed by cyberterrorism. 13 4 This threat is so
salient largely due to the ease of jumping from the Internet to the
networks of the international financial system. Most of those aspects
of the international financial system that do not operate via the
Internet use separate networks that are based on the same protocol
as the Internet-the TCP/IP Protocol. As a result of the inherent
insecurity of the TCP/IP Protocol, as discussed, it is remarkably easy
to attack any network that is based on that protocol.
The international financial system is such a large target for
cyberterrorists
because
of the
substantial
rewards
that
cyberterrorists stand to gain-from stealing large amounts of money
to fund other terrorist acts, to crushing the global economy by
shutting down the international financial system,13 5 to more subtly
affecting international markets by eroding consumer confidence. As
Mike McConnell, the former Director of National Intelligence,
succinctly stated, "what backs up [international markets] is
confidence-an accounting system that is reconcilable." 136
By
crashing stock markets and eroding consumer confidence in banks,
cyberterrorists could effectively recreate the global economic crisis
through which the world has been suffering for the past year. Indeed,
as Mr. McConnell warned former President George W. Bush, if even
one large American bank were successfully attacked, "it would have

134.
The international financial system is a complex system of controlling trade
and investment, and can be construed very loosely to incorporate everything and
anything dealing with money. For the purposes of this article, the term refers primarily
to the international banking sector and the international investment and trade
industries, especially the electronic fund transfers that are integral to these sectors of
the international financial system. The word "international" could easily be omitted
without altering the meaning, as these aspects of the global economy are inherently
international, and have been almost since their inception.
135.
Perl, supra note 73, at 2-3.
[C]yber terrorism could also aim at inflicting economic costs, at times where
communications and information exchange is essential to the functioning of our
societies and to the global economic system. A central goal of Al-Qaeda inspired
terrorists is to cause economic damage, not only physical damage. Increasingly
therefore, I am convinced that communication networks are likely to become
the target of terrorist cyber attacks seeking to paralyze our societies and
economies.

Id.
136.

Sanger, Markoff, & Shanker, supra note 82.
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an order-of-magnitude greater impact on the global economy" than
that of the attacks on September 11, 2001.137
The Internet poses a serious security threat to the international
system. First, as a result of their similar construction, it is possible
to "island-hop" from the Internet to the parallel VANs (value-added
networks) used by the international financial system. Cyberterrorists
would be able to access the networks on which the international
financial system is based by exploiting the common structure of both
the Internet and the separate networks over which most banks and
clearing houses of the international financial system do not send
electronic fund transfers. Once a cyberterrorist has established a
connection on one of the systems, he or she can exploit the weakness
in the TCP/IP Protocol to "jump" to the other.
As sensitive
information is accessible via the Internet, it is feasible that
cyberterrorists could gain access to the information and use it to the
detriment of the entire global economy.
One of the more important systems of the international financial
system, due to the volume of daily transactions, is Fedwire, operated
by the U.S. Federal Reserve System. In 2008, Fedwire processed an
average of approximately 521,000 payments, with an average value of
approximately $ 2.7 trillion, each day.' 3 8 Another key system is the
Clearing House Interbank Payment System (CHIPS), founded by
some of the largest commercial banks,139 which processes over $2
trillion each day.140 Since at least 2005, CHIPS has been available
via the TCP/IP Protocol, opening it up to the kind of network-tonetwork jumping attacks described above.141
Electronic Data
Interchange (EDI),142 a separate network that also is based on the

137.

Id.

138.
FEDERAL RESERVE BD., FEDWIRE FUNDS TRANSFER SYSTEM: ASSESSMENT
OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE CORE PRINCIPLES FOR SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT PAYMENT

SYSTEMS 10 (2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/files/
fedfunds-coreprinciples.pdf.
139.
CHIPS is "a privately operated, real-time multilateral payments system
typically used for large dollar payments . .. The payments transferred over CHIPS are
often related to international interbank transactions." FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION
COUNCIL, WHOLESALE PAYMENT SYSTEMS IT EXAMINATION BOOKLET 5 (2004), available

at http://www.ffiec.gov/ffiecinfobase/booklets/Wholesale/whole.pdf.
140.
The Clearing House, About CHIPS, http://www.chips.org/about/pages/
033738.php (last visited Jan. 4, 2010).
141.
CHIPS Private Network- Live!, CHIPS NEWS BRIEFS (The Clearing House
Payments Co., LLC, New York, NY), Nov. 2005, at 4, availableat http://www.chips.org/
reference/docs_newsBriefs/001338.pdf.
142.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology defines EDI as "the
computer-to-computer interchange of strictly formatted messages that represent
documents other than monetary instruments." NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH.,
FED. INFO. PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBL'N No. 161-2, ANNOUNCING THE STANDARD
FOR ELECTRONIC DATA INTERCHANGE (EDI) para. 3.1 (1996), available at
http://www.itl.nist.gov/fipspubs/fipl6l-2.htm. EDI is supplemented by the Financial
Electronic Data Interchange (FEDI), a similar network entirely devoted to financial
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TCP/IP Protocol, is used extensively by companies to transfer
business documents such as purchase orders and invoices, using
separate dedicated networks. Web-based EDI (i.e., EDI that has been
connected to the Internet) enables electronic commerce, typically
using the Hyper Text Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS).143 Each of
these fundamental networks of the international financial system,
due to their similar structure to the Internet, is inherently vulnerable
to a "jumping" attack.
Although international banks do not often publicize
cyberattacks, "banks send federal regulators some 600,000 alerts a
year about potentially suspicious withdrawals, deposits, transfer, and
money laundering."144 Indeed, the Chief Security Officer of "a major
New York-based financial house" admitted that his company had
been attacked one million times in a single day. 14 5 President Obama
recently used the example of the incident in 2008 in which "thieves
used stolen credit card information to steal millions of dollars from
130 ATM machines in 49 cities around the world-and they did it in
just 30 minutes." 146 This has been going on for decades. 147 As
described above, it is easy to see how cyberterrorists can destabilize
the international financial system and, therefore, the world economy.
A second major security threat is the potential for a direct attack
on those aspects of the international financial system that are
directly connected to the Internet, such as Web-based EDI.
Information sent via the Internet is inherently insecure, and
international banks cannot guarantee that their information is not
being spied upon, stolen, tampered with, or replaced altogether. For
example, if a cyberterrorist discovered a "back-door" to an on-line
brokerage site, he or she could alter the data and set off a run on the
market by dumping massive amounts of shares at the newly altered
higher prices. 14 8 Given the current volatility of international

transactions and utilized not only by individual banks and corporations, but also by the
U.S. and other governments.
143.
When making a purchase via the Internet, you may notice that the address
changes from "http:/f' to "https:/f'-this is indicating that the protocol on which you are
viewing the webpage has changed from the Hyper-Text Transfer Protocol to the HyperText Transfer Protocol Secure-a (theoretically) more secure protocol in order to
protect consumer information that often uses the Secure Sockets Layer protocol. The
Secure Sockets Layer is based on the TCP/IP Protocol, however, and therefore all of the
insecurities described herein, including "island-hopping" (jumping from network to
network), apply there as well. See SCHELL & MARTIN, supra note 1, at 281-82 (defining
and describing "Secure Sockets Layer" and "Secure Transactions").
144.
De Borchgrave, supra note 19 (noting that "Cyberheists have netted billions
for cybercrooks.").
145.
Id.
146.
President Barack Obama, supra note 71.
147.
See supra p. 80 for discussion of the 1994 attack on Citicorp.
148.
A "back door," aka "trap door," is a software shortcoming that is either part
of the software program or added to a software program by a hacker that allows access
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financial markets, this could potentially trigger a domino-effect
across the major financial markets and a devaluation of the entire
global economy.
These possibilities have political ramifications as well. It is not
necessary for the individual to have access to data for the entire
international market; if he or she were able to tamper with the
reports of a single influential country, like Japan or the United
States, the economic impact could begin a ripple effect that would be
felt throughout the international economy.
This could have
potentially destabilizing effects on foreign relations, especially
concerning sensitive economic issues.
Furthermore, despite the unresolved security threats faced by
the international financial system, an overall lack of awareness
continues to render those institutions extremely vulnerable to attack.
Many network administrators either do not understand the nature of
the problem or do not believe that their particular systems are
insecure.1 49
Neither states nor individual members of the
international financial system can afford to remain so unaware,
however, of the serious threat to national and international security
posed by the Internet. This consideration must be factored into the
discussions that are beginning to take place.
Finally, entities must recognize that these problems are
permanent. Though security measures are continually improved, so,
too, is the arsenal deployed by those who would compromise that
security. As described by Denning,
100% security is neither possible nor worth the price. Computer
systems are tremendously complex, containing millions of lines of code.
No single person can comprehend that much code well enough to
confirm that it is free of security holes or hidden trapdoors. . . . The goal
150
is risk management, not risk avoidance at all cost.

Furthermore, increased security often means less flexibility, ease of
use, and interoperability. Thus, difficult choices must be made
regarding security-decisions that require consideration of many
factors. It is no longer a question of whether to act, however, or even
when to act, because time is of the essence. Accordingly, the
remaining question is what actions can be taken to protect national
and international security.

to a computer system. See SCHELL & MARTIN, supra note 1, at 27-28 (describing these
software features).
149.
See Robert Lemos, DNS Hack Leaves Corporate Networks Wide Open,
SLIcON.coM, Aug. 2, 2004, httpd/software.silicon.com/security/0,39024655,39122803,00.htm
(describing one such example of a problem that network administrators are not aware of
that leaves their networks vulnerable to attacks by hackers).
150.
DENNING, supra note 93, at 12.
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IV. ATTEMPTS AT PREVENTION: LAWS, POLICY AND TECHNOLOGY
In an effort to counter the seemingly endless array of available
methods by which cyberterrorists can infiltrate computer networks,
governments, international organizations, and private industry have
taken a number of steps over the years in the areas of law, policy and
technology to protect information and prevent cyberterrorism,
including entering into a multilateral convention, passing domestic
laws, and adopting international technological standards. These
steps toward international cooperation are important and should be
continued. 15' None of these steps, however, is capable of completely
securing the Internet.

A. Laws and Policy
States and international organizations are increasingly
recognizing that international cooperation is key to addressing
cyberterrorism.1 52 The United States has done much to address
cyberterrorism, although the government admits that more is
needed.' 53
International organizations, including the European
Union, NATO, the United Nations, and the OSCE, among others,
have taken important legal and policy steps to address
cybersecurity.1 54 These are just the beginning steps, however, in
attempting to protect national and international security.
1.

U.S. Domestic Efforts

On the domestic side, the U.S. government recently has taken a
number of steps to attempt to secure cyberspace. At a minimum,
these actions recognize the threat to national and international
security posed by the Internet and by cyberterrorism and are a
starting point for resolving those insecurities.
First, even before the attacks on the U.S. and South Korean
governments, the Obama administration brought new focus to the
issues of cyber crime and cyberterrorism by promising to appoint a
"cyber czar" and by issuing the Cyberspace Policy Review, a
comprehensive report on the status of cybersecurity in the United

151.
Perl, supra note 73, at 2-3.
152.
Id.
153.
See THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 82, at iii-iv ("While efforts over the past
two years started key programs and made great strides by bridging previously
disparate agency missions, they provide an incomplete solution".).
154.
See infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing the steps taken by such international
organizations).
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States from a national security perspective.15 5 The Cyberspace Policy
Review recognized up front that the United States still "needs a
strategy for cybersecurity designed to shape the international
environment and bring like-minded nations together on a host of
issues, such as technical standards and acceptable legal norms
regarding territorial jurisdiction, sovereign responsibility, and the
use of force." 156 In the opening pages of that report, the U.S.
government acknowledged that
[t]he architecture of the Nation's digital infrastructure, based largely on
the Internet, is not secure or resilient. Without major advances in the
security of these systems or significant change in how they are
constructed or operated, it is doubtful that the United States can
protect itself from the growing threat of cybercrime and state-sponsored
157
intrusions and operations.

Although the Obama administration may be the first to state the
problem in such categorical terms, it is by no means the first
government or international organization to attempt to address the
issue. 5 8
Congress, too, has been active. Congress passed the well-known
USA PATRIOT Act, the stated intent of which was to deter and
punish terrorists.1 5 9
Congress also passed the Cyber Security
Enhancement Act of 2002 as part of the Homeland Security Act of
2002.160 Senator John Rockefeller recently introduced Senate Bill
773, styled as "The Cybersecurity Act of 2009."161 The Act would
have potentially far-reaching effects, including directing the
President to establish or designate a Cybersecurity Advisory Panel.162
The Act also would require the Department of Commerce to "serve as
the clearinghouse of cybersecurity threat and vulnerability
information" and to "develop and implement a system to provide
cybersecurity status and vulnerability information regarding all
federal information systems and networks managed by the
Department of Commerce," and would require "the Director of
National Intelligence and the Secretary of Commerce to submit to
Congress an annual report on cybersecurity threats to and

155.
See THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 82, at vi (outlining the Administration's
policy goals).
156.
Id. at iv.
157.
Id. at i.
158.
See infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing steps taken by various international
organizations).
159.
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L.
No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified in scattered titles of U.S.C.).
160.
6 U.S.C. § 145 (2009).
Cybersecurity Act of 2009, S. 773, 111th Cong. (2009).
161.
162.
Id. § 3.
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vulnerabilities of critical national information, communication, and
data network infrastructure." 1 63
The Department of Defense is in the process of setting up its own
cybercommand in order to defend its military networks against the
increasing number of cyberattacks and to develop cyber-weapons.1 64
The cybercommand likely will be led by the National Security Agency
as part of U.S. Strategic Command, and should be fully operational
by October 2010.165 The Joint Task Force for Global Network
Operations, under the U.S. Strategic Command, has managed the
Pentagon's computer networks since 2004.166 The U.S. government
also has been conducting cyberattack simulations since at least 1997,
in an effort to identify weaknesses in U.S. computer networks. 167
As a further effort at international cooperation, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is permanently stationing a computer
crime expert in Estonia, which is significant because it is the first
time the FBI has stationed an agent focused purely on cybercrime
outside the United States.168
Finally, the United States, although not a member of the Council
of Europe, signed and ratified the CoE Cybercrime Convention. This

163.
The Library of Congress, Summary of S. 773, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d111:SN00773:@@@D&summ2=m& (last visited Jan. 4, 2010).
164.
William Jackson, DOD Creates Cyber Command As U.S. Strategic
Command Subunit, FED. COMPUTER WK, June 24, 2009, http://www.fcw.com/Articles/
2009/06/24/DOD-launches-cyber-command.aspx.
165.
Id.
166.
See U.S. Strategic Command-Home, http://www.stratcom.mil (last visited
Jan. 4, 2010) (listing its "missions" as including "to ensure US freedom of action in
space and cyberspace"); see also Bradley Graham, Hackers Attack Via Chinese Web
Sites, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2001, at Al (discussing how the Pentagon has responded to
computer attacks from China).
167.
In 1997, the U.S. government conducted Eligible Receiver, which identified
serious vulnerabilities in military systems. See SCHELL & MARTIN, supra note 1, at 112.
Next came Digital Pearl Harbor in 2002, a multi-day war game that simulated a
multiple-industry cyberterrorism attack against critical infrastructure. Id. In 2003, the
government again ran Eligible Receiver, which identified the need for better militarynonmilitary coordination. Id. In 2006, the government ran Cyber Storm I, which
simulated a large-scale attack on critical infrastructures such as energy,
transportation, and telecommunications. See BRENNER, supra note 12, at 49-54. Cyber
Storm I, like the other simulations, identified a multitude of weaknesses and
insecurities. Id. Most recently, in 2008 the government ran Cyber Storm II, which
simulated a coordinated cyber-attack on multiple aspects of critical infrastructure.
Press Release, Department of Homeland Security, DHS Holds Cyber Storm II Exercise
to Further Cyber Security Preparedness and Response Capabilities (Mar. 10, 2008),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1205180340404.shtm; see also Ian
Grant, Cyber Storm 2 Exercise Reveals Security Preparedness,COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM,
Mar. 18, 2008, http://www.computerweekly.com/Articles/2008/03/18/229909/cyberstorm-2-exercise-reveals-security-preparedness.htm
(providing details about the
exercise).
168.
FBI to Station Cybercrime Expert in Estonia, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 11,
2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.comlid/30683801/.
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is an extraordinary step, signaling the United States' willingness to
work with other states on the issue of cybercrime.
2.

Efforts by International Organizations

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE), a branch of the United Nations, has developed numerous
counter-terrorism technical assistance programs, one of which is the
Action against Terrorism Unit (ATU).1 69 The ATU is "the focal point
for co-ordinating and facilitating OSCE counter-terrorism activities,"
which include capacity-building assistance programs, training, and
expert workshops on the subject of counter-terrorism. 170 Since 2004,
cyberterrorism has been one of the ATU's main areas of emphasis. 17 1
Although Ambassador Eric Leb6del of France, Chairman of the OSCE
Forum for Security Co-operation, described the OSCE as being
"proactive" in responding to the threat of cyberterrorism, he admits
that "much remains to be done to face this protean threat which
affects all three OSCE dimensions of security."17 2 The OSCE recently
has held a number of cybersecurity workshops; 173 the most recent
workshop, held on March 17-18, 2009, aimed to bring together key
74
individuals to discuss a comprehensive approach to cyber security.1
NATO has recently taken a number of important steps-first
and foremost, it agreed on a common policy on cyber defense in
January 2008, which was adopted at the Bucharest Summit on April
3, 2008.175 The policy contains, among other things, a commitment to

169.
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Counter-Terrorism
Technical Assistance Programs, http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/directory/doa/OSCE.html (last
visited Jan. 4, 2010).
170.
Id.
Id. ("Combating the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes.").
171.
172.
Press Release, Org. for Sec. & Co-operation in Eur., Co-operation,
Comprehensive Strategies Vital to Facing Cyber Security Challenges, Says Estonian
Defense Minister (Mar. 17, 2009), http://www.osce.org/item/36814.html.
See Perl, supra note 73, at 8 (describing workshops held in 2005, 2006, and
173.
2007).
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Secretariat-Action
174.
against Terrorism Unit: Combating Terrorist Use of the Internet, http://www.osce.org/
atu/17702.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2010).
See North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Topics, Defending Against
175.
Cyber Attacks, What Does This Mean in Practice?, http://www.nato.int/issues/cyberdefence/practice.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2010) [hereinafter NATO Topics].
The Alliance's relevant military and technical committees and bodies, as well
as the Allies individually, are now engaged in implementing the policy. In line
with this, a cyber defence Centre of Excellence has been set up in Estonia and
NATO's Military Committee recently agreed on a Cyber Defence Concept which
adds practical action programmes to fit within the overarching policy.
Id. North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], Bucharest Summit Declaration,para.
at
available
2008),
3,
(Apr.
PR/CP(2008)049
Doc.
NATO
47,
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protecting critical information systems and strengthening nationalinternational cooperation. 176 NATO also created a Cyber Defence
Management Authority,17 7 and established a Cooperative Cyber
Defence Center of Excellence in Tallinn, Estonia, the establishment of
which was preceded by the Bucharest Summit Declaration in April
2008.178 Just a few months ago, the CCD COE held a three-day
conference on cyber warfare, covering such topics as investigating
cyber-espionage networks, "the use of the Internet by terrorist
organizations and the possibilities of terrorist cyber attacks," and
whether sovereignty can "adapt to the cyber security challenge."17 9
Despite these steps, however, "[a]t present, NATO does not define
cyber-attacks as a clear military action. This means that the
provisions of Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, or, in other
words, collective self-defence, will not automatically be extended to
the attacked country."180
The European Union recently launched the Critical Information
Infrastructure Protection Initiative (CIIPI). The CIIPI recognizes the
threat facing critical information infrastructures, "defines a plan of
immediate actions to strengthen the security and resilience of [critical
information infrastructures]," and calls for greater international
cooperation on the subject of infrastructure protection.181 The CIIPI

http://www.globalsecurity.org/militaryllibrary/news/2008/04/mil-080403-natol.htm
[hereinafter Bucharest Summit Declaration] ("We have recently adopted a Policy on
Cyber Defence, and are developing the structures and authorities to carry it out.").

176.

Bucharest Summit Declaration,supra note 175, para. 47.

177.
See NATO Topics, supra note 175 (discussing the phases of development).
178.
See Press Release, N. Atl. Treaty Org., NATO Opens New Centre of
Excellence on Cyber Defence (May 14, 2008), http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2008/05may/e0514a.html ("In April, the Bucharest Summit Declaration paved the way for the
establishment of the Estonian COE, emphasizing the need for NATO members to
protect key information systems and develop the ability to counter a cyber attack.").
179.
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, Agenda for June 17-19,
2009 CCD COE Conference on Cyber Warfare, http://www.cedcoe.org/123.html (last
visited Jan. 4, 2010).
180.
Traynor, supra note 13 (quoting Estonian Defence Minister Jaak Aaviksoo).
See also North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243.
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe
or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and
consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in
exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article
51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so
attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other
Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to
restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Id.
181.

COM (2009) 149 final, supra note 33, at 2; see also Commission Green

Paper on a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection, COM (2005)
576 final (Nov. 17, 2005) (outlining the options to create an initiative for Europe called
EPCIP).
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is meant to work in tandem with the recent actions taken in this area
by the OSCE, the G-8 principles on Critical Information
Infrastructure Protection, 8 2 and the United Nations General
Assembly Resolution 58/199, entitled "Creation of a global culture of
cybersecurity
and
the
protection
of critical
information
infrastructures."18 3
The United Nations Security Council and General Assembly
have also taken actions to address cyberterrorism. General Assembly
Resolution 51/210 of January 16, 1997, calls upon UN member states
to "note the risk of terrorists using electronic or wire communications
systems and networks to carry out criminal acts and . . . to find
means . . . to prevent such criminality and to promote cooperation

where appropriate."184
Security Council Resolution 1373 of
September 28, 2001, calls upon UN member states to increase
international cooperation by way of exchanging information
regarding "use of communications technology by terrorist groups."18 5
Security Council Resolution 1566 of October 8, 2004 calls upon UN
member states to strengthen international cooperation against
terrorism,1 86 and Security Council Resolution 1624 of September 14,
2005 calls upon UN member states to prohibit "incitement to commit
a terrorist act or acts."' 87 These resolutions demonstrate UN member
states' growing commitment to addressing terrorism.
Possibly the most significant step is the Council of Europe's
enactment of the Convention on Cybercrime, which entered into force
in 2004.188 The Convention requires parties to enact substantive and
procedural legislation to criminalize certain computer crimes and
facilitates extradition of those charged with committing such crimes.
The Convention is significant because it is the first multilateral
treaty to address the issues of computer crime and electronic

182.
See G8 Principles for Protecting Critical Information Infrastructures,
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/g82004/G8_CIIPPrinciples.pdf (last visited
Jan. 4, 2010) for the G8 Principles adopted by the Department of Justice.
183.
G.A. Res. 58/199, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/199 (Jan. 30, 2004).
184.
G.A. Res. 51/210, 3(c), U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/210 (Dec. 17, 1996).
185.
S.C. Res. 1373, 3(a), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
186.
S.C. Res. 1566, 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 (Oct. 8, 2004).
187.
S.C. Res. 1624, 1(a), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1624 (Sept. 14, 2005).
188.
Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, Chart of Signatures and
Ratifications, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=185&CM
=2&DF=21/10/2009&CL-ENG (last visited Jan. 4, 2010). The United States signed the
treaty on November 23, 2001, ratified it on September 29, 2006 and asserted a partial
reservation with respect to Article 22, addressing Jurisdiction. Council of Europe,
Convention on Cybercrime, List of Declarations, Reservations, and Other
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp?NTCommunications,
185&CM=2&DF-21/10/2009&CL-ENG&VL-1 (last visited Jan. 4, 2010).
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gathering of evidence related to such crimes.1 89 As of July 17, 2009,
twenty-six states had ratified the Convention, and an additional
twenty had signed but not ratified it.190 Numerous organizations,
including the OSCE and Interpol, have recommended the Convention
as "providing an important international legal and procedural
standard for fighting cyber crime." 191
More recently, the Council of Europe published the Project on
Cybercrime Final Report, which was prepared by the Economic Crime
Division of the Directorate General of Human Rights and Legal
Affairs. 19 2
The purpose of the Final Report is to promote
implementation of the Convention on Cybercrime; it describes a fivepage list of activities relating to cybersecurity that were undertaken
during the period from September 2006 to February 2009, including
numerous regional conferences, meetings, and workshops. 9 3

B. Technology
States, international organizations, and private industry also
have been actively cooperating to develop international standards to
help prevent cyberterrorism. The two main areas of focus have been
standards for economic transactions and standards for encryption.
In order to begin to provide adequate security, states and
international institutions must not only secure the information to be
transmitted (i.e., maintain data integrity), but must also be able to
ensure that the person with whom they are communicating is truly
the person he claims to be (i.e., provide authentication).1 94 The need
for both data integrity and authentication significantly compounds
the security structures to be implemented and maintained.
The first area of concern is provision for data integrity, which
usually is resolved through encryption. Even strong encryption
methods are not foolproof, however. Encryption is most effective in
countering password-sniffing, snooping, and eavesdropping, but is

189.
Multilateral Enforcement Treaties: Hearing Before the S. ForeignRelations
Comm., 108th Cong. (2004) (Statement of Bruce Swartz, Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, Criminal Division).
190.
See Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, Chart of Signatures and
Ratifications, supra note 188 (listing those states that have ratified and signed the
Convention).
191.
Perl, supra note 73, at 5.
192.
COUNCIL OF EUR., PROJECT ON CYBERCRIME FINAL REPORT (SEPTEMBER 2006 FEBRUARY 2009), COUNCIL OF EUR. Doc. ECD/567(2009)1 Provisional (2009), available at
http://www.coe.intit/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/DocumentsReportsPresentations/567-d-final%20reportlh%20provisional%20_14%20may%2009_%20+
footnote.pdf.
193.
Id. at 3-10.
194.
See DENNING, supra note 93, at 51.
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absolutely useless in preventing the injection of malicious code,
spoofing, and tampering, to name a few other types of attacks.
Encryption is only one way to protect data, however. Moreover,
it only protects the data itself, not the network over which the data is
being sent, the intranet or computer from which the data originated,
or any other information on the Internet. Protecting these other
aspects of the network is much more difficult, as a result of both the
basic flaws in the infrastructure of the Internet and the transparency
of information available via the Internet.
The second area of concern, authentication,19 5 can be assuaged to
some degree through the use of methods to validate both the source
196
and content of information and the identity of users during login.
The two most common methods of authentication are passwords and
digital signatures. The most effective type of password is the onetime password, which generally is not susceptible to password
guessing or sniffing attacks due to the sheer effort that is involved-if
a password is a six-digit number that changes randomly each minute,
an attacker has one chance in a million of guessing the password,
which would have to be done in under one minute.19 7 Digital
signatures also can be effective. A digital signature is a form of
public-key cryptography that effectively adds an electronic
"signature" to the end of a message or file, proving that the person
who claims to have sent it actually did so. 1 9 8
Yet these measures have not been enough-they have failed to
prevent massive cyberattacks totaling billions of dollars in losses and
inestimable damage to national security,1 99 as shown in Estonia and
0
It is
more recently in attacks on U.S. government websites.20
of
multiresult
as
a
taken
unclear whether the technological steps
sector international cooperation will be more effective at reducing

Authentication is an issue for both states and multinational corporations.
195.
Returning to the hypothetical case involving Russia and the United States, if the
United States had implemented effective authentication measures, it could have
confirmed that the attacker was not really the Russian government and thus could
have avoided escalated tensions.
DENNING, supra note 93, at 38.
196.
Peter J. Denning, Passwords, in INTERNET BESEIGED: COUNTERING
197.
CYBERSPACE SCOFFLAWS, supra note 101, at 159, 163.
See PC Magazine, Definition of Digital Signature, http://www.pcmag.com/
198.
encyclopedia term/0,2542,t=digital+signature&i=41384,00.asp (last visited Jan. 4,
2010) (defining and illustrating digital signatures).
See Ellen Nakashima & Steven Mufson, Hackers Have Attacked Foreign
199.
Utilities, CIA Analyst Says, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 2008, at A4, available at
2
httpJ/www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/18/AR2008011803 77.html
("[C]yber attackers have made increasingly sophisticated intrusions into corporate
computer systems, costing companies worldwide more than $20 billion each year,
according to some estimates.").
James D. Zirin, Abdicating on a Cyber Czar?, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2009, at
200.
4 2 00 9
A25, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentarylla-oe-zirinl octl4,0,603775.story.
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both the scope and the magnitude of the potential damage inflicted by
cyberterrorist attacks.
1.

International Standards for Economic Transactions

International standards for economic transactions are critical to
protecting information and networks in the international financial
system from cyberterrorism. Although states and private industry
have played some role, international organizations have been the
primary developers of the current standards.
A number of organizations have played important roles in the
process, especially in coordinating policies among countries. Of these,
the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), the International
Organization for Standards, the International Electrotechnical
Commission, and the International Telecommunication Union are
some of the most important.2 0 These organizations helped develop
the first standard, known as ANSI X-12, which has been ubiquitous
for the past thirty years. 202 ANSI also maintains the ANSI X9.9
standard, which is used to prevent the unauthorized manipulation or
loss of Electronic Funds Transfer data.2 03 The global standard, the
United Nations Electronic Data Interchange for Administration,
Commerce, and Trade (UN/EDIFACT), is also increasingly important.
This international EDI standard was developed and is maintained by
the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Centre for
Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business. 204 Both the European
Union and the United States have endorsed UN/EDIFACT. 205
Indeed, some countries require the use of UN/EDIFACT as a matter
of law. 206

201.
See
INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE
INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE:
AGENDA
FOR

TASK FORCE,
COOPERATION,

THE GLOBAL
available at

http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/giiagend.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2010) ("Three
principal international standards organizations involved in the development of
information technology and telecommunications standards are the International
Organization for Standards (ISO), the International Electrotechnical Commission
(IEC), and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU).").
202.
Howard Millman, A Brief History of EDI, INFOWORLD, Apr. 6, 1998, at 83
(1998).
203.
Treas. Dep't Order 106-09 (Oct. 2, 1986), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/
regs/tol06-09.htm.
204.
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, United Nations
Directories for Electronic Data Interchange for Administration, Commerce and
Transport, UN/EDIFACT, http://www.unece.org/trade/untdid/welcome.htm (last visited
Jan. 4, 2010).

205.

The Future of Money: Hearing Before the House Subcommittee on Domestic

and International Monetary Policy, 104th Cong. 193 (1996) (statement of Jeffrey B.
Ritter, Program Director, ECLIPS, Ohio Supercomputer Center and Chair, American
Bar Association Committee on the Law of Commerce in Cyberspace).
206.
Id.
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The U.S. government has also dedicated extensive resources to
the issue, most notably via the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA), a branch of the Department of
Commerce. 207 NTIA's Office of International Affairs is particularly
active in the area of Internet regulations, as it plays a key role in
advising the President on international telecommunications and
information policy. 208 Private industry also has taken steps to
address the issue, and industry leaders are currently investigating
various regulation measures, often in collaboration with one or two
sister companies. Visa and MasterCard, for example, consolidated
their standards into the Secure Electronic Transactions payment
system. 209 Key recovery systems are becoming another increasingly
demanded component of international standards.
2.

International Standards for Encryption

Another technological option to reduce network insecurity is
encryption, which has been used in various increasingly complex
forms for hundreds of years. Banking and financial institutions in
the United States have used the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) since 2001, when it was published by the National Institute of
Standards and Technology. 210 AES uses a 128, 192, or 256 bit key to
encrypt data in 128-bit blocks. 2 11
Although better and stronger forms of encryption are constantly
being developed, the search for stronger encryption appears to be
never-ending, because each increase in encryption strength seems to
be matched by an advance in decryption. It is a bit like trying to
secure a house-one can add as many locks and deadbolts as possible
to the front door, but no matter how many locks are installed or how
complicated they are, given enough time and enough resources, even

207.
See
generally
National
Telecommunications
and
Information
Administration, Office of International Affairs, http://www.ntia.doc.gov/oiahome/
oiahome.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2009) (explaining the function of the Office of
International Affairs).
208.
Id.
209.
Anish Bhimani, Securing the Commercial Internet, in INTERNET BESEIGED:
COUNTERING CYBERSPACE SCOFFLAWS, supra note 101, at 407, 417.
210.
See NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., FED. INFO. PROCESSING
STANDARDS PUBL'N NO. 197, ANNOUNCING THE ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD

(AES) (2001), available at http://www.csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fipsl97/fips-197.pdf
(outlining the specifications for the Advanced Encryption Standard).
211.
See Press Release No. G 2001-111, Nat'l Inst. of Standards & Tech.,
Commerce Secretary Announces New Standard for Global Information Security (Dec. 4,
2001), available at http://www.nist.gov/public affairs/releases/gOl-111.htm ("Secretary
of Commerce Don Evans today announced approval of a new information technology
encryption standard for the federal government."); see also Zimmerman, supra note 52,
at 110 (explaining how "[w]ell-designed cryptography systems can ensure the secrecy"
of e-mail and other electronically sent information).
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the most "unbreakable" of situations can be hacked. Furthermore,
there is usually a back door or a window that is less secure.
Essentially, encryption only allows a network to stay just one step
ahead, and sometimes not even that.

C. Attempts Are Insufficient to Prevent Cyberterrorism
States, private industry, and international organizations are
taking important legal, policy, and technological steps to combat
cyberterrorism. The steps taken to date, however, are insufficient,
212
and greater international cooperation is needed.
On the legal and policy side, states and international
organizations have generated the beginnings of what could be
significant efforts to mitigate the damage done by cyberterrorism.
More must be done, however, and at a faster pace, to catch up to
cyberterrorists and to attempt to address the threats to national and
international security that cyberterrorism poses. Such efforts could
include a convention on cyberterrorism, a UN conference on
cyberterrorism, or some other similar measure. On the technological
side, much is riding on the few international standards presently in
As technology progresses, these standards will become
place.
outdated. States, private industry, and international organizations
should begin discussions of the next standards sooner rather than
later.
The problems posed by the inherent insecurity of the TCP/IP
Protocol are extremely difficult, if not in some cases impossible, to
solve, however. States and international organizations must question
whether they are willing to accept such a fundamental threat to their
national and international security. In the end, it is an issue of risk
management and of deterrence.
Initially, the question arises of whether standards should be
established at all. Indeed, regulation brings with it numerous
problems, not the least of which is a false sense of security.
Furthermore, if better standards and security measures are not
continually developed, those working to break security mechanisms
will quickly catch up to and surpass those trying to maintain security.
The U.S. government acknowledged this deficiency in the early phase
of the public Internet, stating in The Framework for Global Electronic
Commerce that setting standards too soon can lock in outdated

James Jones, U.S. Nat'1 Sec. Adviser, Remarks at 45th Munich Conference
212.
On Security Policy (Feb. 9, 2009), available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/18515/
remarksbynational security-adviserjones-at_45thmunichconference-onsecurity
policy.htmlGable camera ready-final.doc ("If there is one overriding characteristic to
the world we face, it is the truth that security is shared.").
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technology. 213 Once in motion, however, the momentum behind
standardization may be nearly impossible to reverse, even if the
potential problems significantly outweighed the potential benefits.

V.

DETERRENCE VIA PRESCRIPTIVE JURISDICTION

Cyberspace really is the final frontier-borderless, pervasive,
and potentially very dangerous. In this new realm, territory is
irrelevant, which means that a radical upheaval of the traditional
territory-based model of sovereignty and jurisdiction that has existed
for the past few hundred years is all but inevitable. 2 14
As
cyberterrorism cannot be prevented, the next logical step is to
attempt to deter cyberterrorists by means of effective and consistent
prosecution.
International law provides several forms of jurisdiction to
prescribe (i.e., to apply one's laws); 215 nationality jurisdiction, based
on either the nationality of the victim (passive personality) or the
aggressor (active personality); territorial jurisdiction, based on the
crime occurring in or affecting a state's territory (objective) or
commencing in a state's territory despite completion elsewhere
(subjective); universal jurisdiction, based on the extreme gravity of
the crime under international law; and protective jurisdiction, based
on a threat to the security and integrity of the state. 216 Of those,
territorial jurisdiction and universal jurisdiction are of particular
interest to deterring cyberterrorism. It is extremely difficult to apply
territorial jurisdiction to cyberterrorism, however, due to both the
nature of the Internet and the realities of cyberterrorism. Universal
jurisdiction is much easier to apply, in part because it shares with
cyberterrorism a disregard of national borders. Thus, this increased
facility makes universal jurisdiction a much more feasible option for
deterrence.

213.
THE WHITE HOUSE, THE FRAMEWORK FOR GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
(1997), availableat http://clinton4.nara.gov/textonly/WHINew/Commerce/read.html.
214.
Thomas Schultz, Carving up the Internet: Jurisdiction,Legal Orders, and
the Private/PublicInternationalLaw Interface, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 799, 800-01 (2008).
215.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 401 cmt. a (1987) ("Aspects of Jurisdiction").
216.
See James D. Fry, Terrorism as a Crime Against Humanity and Genocide:
The Backdoor to Universal Jurisdiction,7 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 169, 17374 (2002) (discussing jurisdiction over crimes committed outside the prosecuting state's
territory); see also Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International
Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785, 786-87 (1988) [hereinafter Randall, Universal Jurisdiction]
(explaining the international principles of jurisdiction).
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A. TerritorialJurisdiction-TooUnwieldy For Cyberterrorism
The ability of a state to apply its laws under the international
law concept of territorial jurisdiction is generally based on the
location of the attack. 217 Territorial jurisdiction is important to
international law and is one of the most fundamental and wellaccepted methods of exercising jurisdiction to prescribe. Indeed,
Professor Raustiala describes territoriality as providing "the bedrock
principles for the development of modern international law."2 18 Due
to the nature of the Internet and the realities of cyberterrorism,
however, the use of territorial jurisdiction is at best exceedingly
complicated and at worst infeasible.
First, there is no territory in cyberspace where cyberterrorism is
concerned. 219 Scholars such as Professors Goldsmith and Wu argue
that characterizations of the Internet as borderless or lacking any
territorial connection are invalid because the Internet increasingly is
conforming to national laws and requirements, thus losing the
characteristic of being beyond the state. 220
Similarly, Professor
Raustiala describes the Internet as "increasingly bordered" and
subject to the control of sovereign states.2 2 1 Although these analyses
may apply with respect to certain areas of law, it does not apply with
respect to cyberterrorism for a number of reasons, not least of which
is that there presently are no national laws that apply directly to
cyberterrorism. 2 2 2 Furthermore, although cyberspace may be subject
to state control in the sense that domain names can be assigned or
content can be filtered, no state can control cyberterrorism from a

217.
See Randall, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 216, at 786-87 (The
territoriality principle is invoked "when an offense occurs in the prosecuting state's
territory."). This form of territorial jurisdiction is also known as "objective territorial
jurisdiction." A situation where an attack begins on the territory of State A but
completes on the territory of State B may give State A what is called "subjective
territorial jurisdiction"; in that situation, State B would have objective territorial
jurisdiction.
218.
KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG? THE
EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 11 (2009).

219.
See, e.g., Sean P. Kanuck, Information Warfare: New Challenges for Public
International Law, 37 HARV. INT'L L. J. 272, 288 (1996) ("Even in the most abstract
sense, the notion of territory (and its corollary on possessory rights) can only
imperfectly account for the information realm. Cyberspace and information alike
transcend physical boundaries, thereby requiring a legal paradigm that looks beyond
merely the locus of events.").
220.
See generally GOLDSMITH & WU I, supra note 36 at 87-104 (explaining how
national laws control internet activity).
221.

RAUSTIALA, supra note 218, at 9.

222.
Although some domestic and international laws have been enacted to
address cybercrime, they do not specifically address cyberterrorism.
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technological perspective. 2 23 Cyberterrorists operate without borders,
explicitly refusing to obey any parameters a state may have erected
for law-abiding citizens. As a result, these concepts of a "bordered"
Internet are inapposite in the context of cyberterrorism.
Although states may attempt to assert jurisdiction based on the
state where an individual views a website or the state of
incorporation of a company whose website is involved in a dispute,
such situations do not exist in cyberterrorism. Cyberterrorists attack
not just particular data, such as stock prices, but entire computer
systems, such as stock exchanges or power grids. Determining the
origin of a cyberattack in the later scenario is even more difficult
because it is unclear where the crime being committed occurs-in
truth, the crime itself occurs in cyberspace. 224
A second and related problem is determining the location of the
computer the cyberterrorist is using to launch the attack. Due to the
fact that cyberterrorists operate beyond the territory of any state,
often use computers in multiple states to commit their crimes, and
have extensive technological tools at their disposal to make it look
like the attack came from elsewhere, it is exceedingly difficult to
make the traditional determinations necessary to assert territorial
jurisdiction. The identity and location of a cyberterrorist is nearly
impossible to pinpoint, as cyberterrorists intentionally conceal their
location by looping or leapfrogging several computer systems in
several countries before attacking their target. 225 Recall that in the
recent attack on the U.S. and South Korean governments, the South
Korean government initially believed that the attack originated in
North Korea. 226 Only later did they come to believe (and even then,
not definitively) that the attack may have originated from within the
United Kingdom. 227 The same thing happened with the 2007 attacks
on Estonia. 228
Although it may be possible to identify a computer's (and
therefore cyberterrorist's) IP address by using tracing packets, which
might provide the path that the cyberterrorist took to reach his
destination and, therefore, his original location, this method is far
from guaranteed to identify a particular computer,2 2 9 especially given

223.
See John B. Avion, The Growing Cyberthreat, FORBES, Oct. 20, 2009,
http://www.forbes.com/2009/10/20/digital-warfare-cyber-security-opinions-contributorsjohn-p-avlon.html (describing the United States' vulnerability towards cyberattacks).
Kanuck, supra note 218, at 288 ("From a legal perspective, even more
224.
problematic than information warfare against data is an attack against the medium
itself.").
225.
De Borchgrave, supranote 19.
226.
Williams, supra note 10.
Id.
227.
228.
See BRENNER, supranote 12, at 5-6, 133.
229.
Goldsmith & Wu II, supra note 36, at 43.
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that IP addresses are not necessarily static.2 30 Furthermore, a
cyberterrorist can spoof this information or use an anonymous or
masked IP address, 23 1 confounding attempts to determine with any
accuracy the true location or identity of the attacker. 2 32 As Professor
Brenner explained, this enables cyberterrorists to manipulate and
obfuscate their true location ("point of attack origin"), leading to
misidentification of the identity and location of the cyberterrorist and
the nature of the attack (state-sponsored or not).233 As a result, point
of attack origin can be given only limited weight in attributing blame
for cyberterrorist attacks. 234 Looking at this aspect of the attack for
purposes of establishing jurisdiction is nearly impossible.
A third difficulty exists in determining whether other states may
have an interest in asserting jurisdiction. As previously discussed,
cyberterrorists often loop their attacks through multiple computers or
servers, which may be in different states, in an effort to disguise their
location. Determining whether any of those additional computers
represent additional cyberterrorists that are actually involved or are
merely decoys renders the necessary analyses even more complicated.
Although the territorial effects doctrine of jurisdiction
theoretically could be applied, 235 the admissibility of the doctrine

230.
IP addresses are assigned by Internet Service Providers like Comcast,
Verizon, or RCN, which do not always have enough IP addresses to assign them
permanently. See SCHELL & MARTIN, supra note 1, at 264.
231.
See id. at 15 (noting ways that a hacker can visit websites without leaving
a trace of his or her visit, such as proxy servers, Janus, and the Anonymizer).
232.
Kanuck, supranote 219, at 287-88.
A satellite can be owned, identified, and located. These traits make it possible
to evaluate actions conducted by or against it. Satellite emissions, cellular
telephone calls, and e-mail messages, on the other hand, may be 'owned' in
some sense, but their identification or location can easily be prevented, thereby
rendering attribution and regulation ineffective. . . . The uncertainties
surrounding the actual ownership of information have led to the development
of cryptographic techniques that protect the very ideas, or information itself,
for which the law offers no aegis.

Id.
233.
See BRENNER, supra note 12, at 133-34.
234.
Id.
235.
The territorial effects doctrine, essentially a form of the objective
territoriality principle of jurisdiction, holds that if an action taken in another country
has serious effects on a state, the affected state may find jurisdiction to apply its laws
to prosecute the crime. The Permanent Court of International Justice recognized the
territorial effects doctrine as a proper basis for prescriptive jurisdiction in The Case of

the S.S. Lotus. See Sanjay S. Mody, National Cyberspace Regulation: Unbundling the
Concept of Jurisdiction, 37 STAN. J. INT'L L. 365 (2001) (arguing that regulating
transnational cyberspace activity is fully consistent with a state's rulemaking
authority under international law).
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under international law is controversial in many states. 236 As
cyberterrorism must be widely condemned in order for that
condemnation and prosecution to have any deterrent effect, a basis of
jurisdiction not widely accepted in the international community is
insufficient. Furthermore, although the territorial effects doctrine, or
the "tighter" version thereof as described by Professor Thomas
Schultz where the defendant is determined to have purposefully
availed himself of the forum where the injury was caused,2 3 7 may
make sense for civil actions, it is not applicable to cyberterrorism. As
discussed, cyberspace is nowhere and everywhere.
Defacing or
shutting down a website happens in cyberspace, not in the territory of
a given state. 23 8 Although some cyberattacks, such as that on the
government of Estonia, could be seen as being intended to harm the
government of Estonia, the targets of cyberattacks are not always so
easily identified.
Each of these difficulties makes it impractical to attempt to
assert territorial jurisdiction, especially if the primary goal is
deterrence. Cyberterrorists are not likely to be deterred if it takes
years just to identify the attackers and where they are located.
Further, once identification is accomplished, states may wrangle over
extradition. Although the identity and location of the cyberterrorist
must be determined prior to asserting any form of prescriptive
jurisdiction (including universal jurisdiction), effective deterrence
also requires an ease of prosecution that only universal jurisdiction
can provide.
It is difficult enough to identify and locate
cyberterrorists; if they can only be prosecuted if they happen to visit
the state they attacked, effective prosecution would be impossible.

236.
Schultz, supra note 214, at 812. The territorial effects doctrine is not
controversial in the United States, however, and may be increasingly accepted abroad.
See RAUSTIALA, supra note 218, at 188-89.
237.
Schultz, supra note 214, at 817. In many ways, this "tighter" version is akin
to the analysis of Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987), a case
from U.S civil procedure law governing personal jurisdiction and holding that a
potential defendant must purposefully avail itself of a forum before jurisdiction will be
found in that forum.
238.
Kanuck, supra note 219, at 287.
Now add the further wrinkle that 'cyber-transactions' can occur anonymously,
in perfect secrecy with the aid of encryption, and completely outside of all legal
jurisdictions. It seems rather difficult, indeed, to identify exactly where the
information in Citibank or AT&T's international databases exists, or to which
jurisdiction's laws the electromagnetic quanta carrying an encrypted cellular
telephone call are subject. Any comprehensive regulator structure based on
physical location thus seems grossly inadequate.

Id.
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Thus, territorial jurisdiction is too restrictive23 9 and would
provide only a limited deterrent, if any, to cyberterrorism. Due to the
absence of these complicating factors with respect to universal
jurisdiction,
prosecution
of cyberterrorism under universal
jurisdiction would be a more effective deterrent.
B. UniversalJurisdiction-UniquelySuited To Cyberterrorism
Cyberterrorism is not your garden variety crime.
It is a
particularly heinous act, a version of terrorism on par with more
"traditional" acts carried out by Al Qaeda and other terrorist
organizations, and it is even more difficult to defend against due to
the borderless, state-less, and territory-less nature of cyberspace. 24 0
Similarly, universal jurisdiction is not your garden variety basis
for exercising prescriptive jurisdiction. Of the many ways to obtain
jurisdiction under international law, universal jurisdiction is perhaps
the most extreme, although probably not the most controversial. 2 41
Far from the more traditional sources of jurisdiction, where the
connection to a state's nationals or territory confers authority to
prosecute, universal jurisdiction "confers on any nation the authority
to prosecute alleged international criminals, even when the
prosecuting nation has no connection whatsoever with the offense." 2 42
Although universal prescriptive jurisdiction has existed for centuries,
it only now seems to be "coming into its own as a systematic means
for promoting legal accountability. 243

239.
Schultz, supra note 214, at 811 (explaining that territorial jurisdiction is "a
too restrictive basis of jurisdiction in the face of information flows potentially having
effects in every country of the world.").
240.
Indeed, Al Qaeda and others have indicated their desire to attack the
United States using cyberterrorism. See President Barack Obama, supra note 71
(discussing the challenges facing America's digital infrastructure). Furthermore,
terrorist groups are growing increasingly nimble in their use of the Internet and are
increasingly able to parry and evade cyberattacks themselves. See Report from
International Institute for Strategic Studies and Young Professionals in Foreign Policy
Panel Discussion on "NATO-Cyber-Crime and Cyber-Security" (July 19, 2007),
available at http://www.iiss.org/EasysiteWeb/getresource.axd?AssetlD=2695&type=full
&servicetype=Attachment (exploring the role that NATO could play in combating cyber
terrorism).
241.
That dubious distinction arguably belongs to either the territorial effects
doctrine or the protective principle.
242.
Kenneth C. Randall, Book Review, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 627, 627 (2004)
(reviewing LUC REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL
LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (2003)) [hereinafter Randall, Book Review]; see also Eugene

Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction'sHollow Foundation,
45 HARV. INTL L.J. 183, 183 n.3 (2004) (noting various iterations of definitions of
universal jurisdiction).
243.
Steven W. Becker, Commentary on the Princeton Principles, in BURNS H.
WESTON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 1370, 1371 (4th ed. 2006).
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As it is all but impossible to prevent cyberterrorism, the next
best solution is to deter those who would commit acts of
cyberterrorism. Like most crimes, deterrence is accomplished by way
of effective and consistent prosecution. Unlike most crimes, however,
cyberterrorists are often motivated by political, religious, or
ideological causes, which make deterrence more challenging. 244 Due
to both the broad reach of universal jurisdiction and the inherent
practical difficulties caused by those terrorists operating in
cyberspace, universal jurisdiction is the most efficient way to deter
cyberterrorism, provide accountability, and promote international
peace and justice. 245
The arguments for extending universal jurisdiction to
cyberterrorism are many and varied. First, a case can be made that
there is a basis in either treaty law or customary international law
for extending universal jurisdiction over cyberterrorism. Second, the
heinousness of the crime is on par with traditional terrorism,
genocide, and crimes against humanity. These crimes were subjected
to universal jurisdiction not because they were analogous to piracy, as
Professor Eugene Kontorovich argues, 246 but because of the heinous
nature of the crimes. Furthermore, an analogy can be made to piracy,
not based on whether piracy was or was not outlawed for its
heinousness, but based on the definition of piracy as a "crime
committed more or less indiscriminately against citizens of different
nations . . . on the high seas."247 Third, each of the rationales that
have been provided for universal jurisdiction, as outlined by Jonathan
Marks, 248 applies at least in some degree to cyberterrorism. Finally,
various other concerns that have been raised in the context of
traditional terrorism, such as the difficulty in defining terrorism and
the possibility of universal jurisdiction getting out of control, are not
causes for concern with respect to cyberterrorism.

244.
BRENNER, supra note 12, at 7.
245.
See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdictionfor International Crimes:
Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 81, 153 (2001)
("Universal jurisdiction is the most effective method to deter and prevent international
crimes by increasing the likelihood of prosecution and punishment of its perpetrators.
This approach to international criminal accountability is also believed to be a factor in
reducing impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes.").
246.
See generally Kontorovich, supra note 242 (arguing that the piracy analogy
is an insufficient method to support new universal jurisdiction).
247.
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Defining Limits: Universal Jurisdiction and
National Courts, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE
PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 168, 169 (Stephen

Macedo ed., 2006).
248.
Jonathan H. Marks, Mending the Web: Universal Jurisdiction,
HumanitarianIntervention and the Abrogation of Immunity by the Security Council, 42
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 445, 463-71 (2004) [hereinafter Marks, Mending the Web].
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The Case for Universal Jurisdiction

As a general rule, universal jurisdiction can be based in either a
treaty regime or customary international law. 249 In the case of
terrorism and, by extension, cyberterrorism, both treaty law and
customary international law provide legitimate bases for the exercise
of universal jurisdiction.
First, numerous treaties recognize various forms of terrorism as
international crimes, such as the Convention to Prevent and Punish
Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and
Related Extortion that are of International Significance, 250 and the
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings. 251 Although none of these recognizes cyberterrorism
specifically, cyberterrorism is, in many ways, a form of terrorism
generally.
Indeed, by definition, cyberterrorism is traditional
terrorism carried out via the Internet or against the Internet. 252 As a
result, these treaties conceivably could apply to cyberterrorism.
Second, the general prohibition on terrorism (and, by extension,
cyberterrorism) arguably has become subject to universal jurisdiction
as a matter of customary international law. Although a complete
treatment of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article, both the
required elements of customary international law (opinio juris and
state practice) are satisfied for terrorism. 2 53
States consider
terrorism (putting aside the issue of definition) as a heinous crime on
the order of a crime against humanity (opiniojuris) and have acted to
memorialize that consideration in a number of treaties (state
practice) as described above. 254
In addition, the international
community generally condemns terrorism as a crime against

249.
Leila Nadya Sadat, Redefining Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 241, 244 (2001).
250.
Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of
Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance,
Feb. 2, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 3949 [hereinafter Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of
Terrorism].
251.
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Jan.
9, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 249.
252.
See BRENNER, supra note 12, at 37.
253.
This is the generally-accepted expression of customary international law.
Some may dispute the need to establish opinio juris and/or state practice. See, e.g.,
Randall, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 216, at 827-29 (describing various
statements and actions by states and concluding that terrorism is an international
crime).
254.
Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism, supra note 250;
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, supra note 251.
See Fry, supra note 216, at 182-83 (describing efforts to define terrorism).
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humanity. 255 The United Nations Security Council has been vocal in
its condemnation of terrorism. 256 The international community as a
whole voiced opposition to terrorism in United Nations General
Assembly Resolution 51/210, which recognized the potential for
cyberterrorism (though not using that term) and called upon states to
promote international cooperation to prevent cyberterrorism. 257
States and international organizations are actively working to
implement these resolutions, thus demonstrating both opinio juris
and state practice. 258
In recent decades, the international community has expanded
the category of offenses subject to international law and has
recognized a number of international crimes that are so serious that
the aut dedere aut judicare (extradite or prosecute) principle
applies. 259 As Professor Damrosch explained, the category of crimes
subject to universal jurisdiction is "more or less congruent with those
entailing prosecute-or-extradite obligations," 260 and many forms of
terrorism presently entail prosecute-or-extradite obligations. 261
Further, courts and lawmakers increasingly are applying or invoking
universal jurisdiction for various terrorist actions. 262 As a result, one
may conclude that terrorism, and by extension cyberterrorism, is
subject to universal jurisdiction. 263

255.
See Fry, supra note 216 (providing the illustrative example of U.S.
Secretary of State Colin Powell declaring the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World
Trade Center in New York City and on the Pentagon in Washington D.C. as a crime
against humanity, and arguing that this description is accurate).
256.
See S.C. Res. 1566, supra note 186 (calling upon UN member-states to
strengthen international cooperation against terrorism); S.C. Res. 1624, supra note
187, T 1(a) (calls upon UN member-states to prohibit "incitement to commit a terrorist
act or acts"); S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 185, 1 3(a) (calling upon UN member-states to
increase international cooperation by way of exchanging information regarding "use of
communications technology by terrorist groups").
257.
G.A. Res. 51/210, supra note 184, 3(c).
258.
See, e.g., Bucharest Summit Declaration, supra note 175, para. 15
(announcing a commitment to fully implement UNSCR 1373 and "related UNSCRs, in
particular UNSCR 1540").
259.
See Randall, Universal Jurisdiction,supra note 216, at 789 (arguing that in
the postwar decades states have generally recognized that some crimes required
prosecution or extradition regardless of the nationality of the accused or the location of
the crime).
260.
Lori F. Damrosch, Comment: Connecting the Threads, in UNIVERSAL
JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supranote 247, at 91, 93.
261.
Id. at 93.
262.
See Randall, Universal Jurisdiction,supra note 216, at 789-90 (noting the
example of United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212 (N.D. Cal.), appeal dismissed, 645
F.2d 681 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 972 (1981), and citing remarks by Senator
Specter, 131 CONG. REC. S8999 (daily ed. June 27, 1985) (statement of Sen. Specter),
which argue that universal jurisdiction should be applied to terrorists by comparison to
pirates and slave traders).
263.
Also drawing this conclusion are, among others, Damrosch, supra note 260,
at 93-94, and Randall, Universal Jurisdiction,supra note 216, at 789-90.
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Thus, universal jurisdiction exists as a means of prosecuting and
deterring cyberterrorists pursuant to a variety of rationales and
analyses.
Providing states with the ability to prosecute
cyberterrorists would send "a strong message . . . to terrorists that
they are never safe from prosecution." 264 Although such application
is not without difficulty due to the nature of cyberspace, that
difficulty would exist no matter what form of jurisdiction might be
applied, and other prescriptive bases for jurisdiction, such as
territorial jurisdiction, are fraught with even more difficulty.
Effective deterrence would be impossible if an attacked state had to
wait for a cyberterrorist either to voluntarily enter the country or be
extradited by a country friendly to the attacked state. Applying the
analyses and rationales provided by other international law scholars
thus strengthens the case for universal jurisdiction over
cyberterrorism.
2.

The Non-Piracy Analogy

As noted above, the principle of universal jurisdiction to
prosecute acts, under international law, is "the principle that certain
crimes are so heinous and so universally recognized and abhorred,
that a state is entitled or even obliged to undertake legal proceedings
without regard to where the crime was committed or the nationality
Historically, universal
of the perpetrators or the victims." 265
jurisdiction applied only to pirates, who were considered enemies of
all mankind. 26 6 Under universal jurisdiction, if pirates were caught,
any state could prosecute them on behalf of the international
community. 267 Although there does not seem to be a definitive
definition of piracy, it generally is defined as an act committed by
non-state actors aboard a vessel on the high seas or outside of any
state's jurisdiction. 268
In the past few decades, universal jurisdiction has become
accepted with regard to a greater variety of violations of international
law, such as war crimes, 2 69 crimes against humanity, 270 and

Fry, supra note 216, at 197-98 (arguing for deterrence but noting that the
264.
deterrence argument assumes that the terrorist is a rational actor, which may or may
not be a valid assumption).
Stephen Macedo, Introduction, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL
265.
COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note 247, at 1, 4.
266.
Randall, Universal Jurisdiction,note 216, at 791.
267.
Id.
268.
See id. at 791-98 (discussing the history and rationale behind universal
jurisdiction over piracy).
Randall, Universal Jurisdiction,supra note 216, at 800; see generally Henry
269.

T. King, Jr., Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities, Prospects, War Crimes and
Crimes Against Humanity: The Nuremberg Precedent, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 281 (2001)
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genocide. 271 In each of those instances, judges and scholars put forth
the rationale that universal jurisdiction applies because of the
heinousness of those crimes; they were seen as being so inherently
wrong that they effectively were crimes against society. 27 2 Although
piracy may have been used as an analogy, the specific circumstances
of the crime were not at the heart of the analysis; instead, the
heinousness of the crime in question, as well as, in some
circumstances, the non-viability of territorial or national jurisdiction
was the true rationale. 2 73 The Princeton Principles also recognize the
heinousness of a crime as the basis for universal jurisdiction. 2 74
Professor Kontorovich asserts that applications of universal
jurisdiction based on the piracy analogy are meaningless because
those analogies were wrongly based on the assumption that piracy
was subject to universal jurisdiction due to its heinousness. 275 He
explains that piracy actually was not considered especially heinous
and therefore that could not have been the reason it was subject to
universal jurisdiction. 2 76 His argument does not, however, entirely
defeat the case for universal jurisdiction. Even if piracy was not
considered especially heinous (and heinousness not the reason why
piracy was undisputedly subject to universal jurisdiction),27 7 that

(describing the expansion in application of universal jurisdiction after Nuremburg to
include war crimes, and arguing for a continued expansion of universal jurisdiction).
270.
Randall, UniversalJurisdiction,supra note 216, at 800.
271.
See Randall, Universal Jurisdiction,supra note 216, at 834-37 (describing
the legal development of genocide as a universal jurisdiction crime).
272.
See, e.g., Madeline H. Morris, Universal Jurisdiction in a Divided World:
Conference Remarks, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 337, 337 (2001) ("The rationale for universal
jurisdiction is that crimes such as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity
are an affront to humanity and, therefore, are of concern to all states.").
See Randall, Book Review, supra note 242, at 628 ("[Mloot today is an
273.
analysis of whether the current universal offenses are analogous to the original
universal offense of piracy."); Leila Nadya Sadat, Redefining Universal Jurisdiction,35
NEW ENG. L. REV. 241, 244 (2001) ("Application of the theory of universal jurisdiction
in these case is predicated largely on the notion that some crimes are so heinous that
they offend the interest of all humanity - indeed, they imperil civilization itself.").
See PRINCETON PROJECT ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, THE PRINCETON
274.
PRINCIPLES ON JURISDICTION 23 (2001), available at http://lapa.princeton.edu/
hosteddocs/univejur.pdf ("National courts can exercise universal jurisdiction to
prosecute and punish, and thereby deter, heinous acts recognized as serious crimes
under international law.").
275.
Kontorovich, supra note 242, at 186.
276.
Id.
277.
Although Kontorovich is not able to explain what that reason was, it is
unclear whether there is an explanation to be had. See generally Joshua Michael
Goodwin, Universal Jurisdiction and the Pirate: Time for an Old Couple to Part, 39
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 973 (2006) (examining the history of piracy and submitting
various rationales for subjecting piracy to universal jurisdiction, such as disruption of
trade and other economic concerns, but not determining that any one explanation is
correct).
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does not necessarily render the last few decades of international
criminal law meaningless.
In the last few decades, the international community has
recognized a number of international crimes as subject to universal
Those international crimes, such as genocide, war
jurisdiction.
crimes, and crimes against humanity, provide at a minimum the
opportunity for a state to act on behalf of itself and the international
community by addressing the heinous act(s) in question.27 8 Merely
because the Nuremberg Tribunal and the Israeli Supreme Court
analogized the heinousness of war crimes to what they thought was
the heinousness of piracy, their judgments did not rise and fall on
whether war crimes were like piracy, but on whether war crimes were
especially heinous acts. 279 The courts did not dwell, for instance, on
whether the war crimes were committed on the high seas, outside of
state control, by glorified robbers, or on a ship (to take it to its logical
extreme).2 80 Instead, they based their decisions on the gravity of the
acts and the unlikelihood of the state to criminalize the acts, using
piracy only as an analogy based on their (possibly misguided)
understanding of why universal jurisdiction applied to piracy. One
possible factual error cannot unmake decades of international
criminal law. In fact, such a body of law has built up around the
heinousness of a crime as the determining factor for extending
universal jurisdiction that that is now understood as the litmus test,
with piracy only an afterthought thrown in for good measure.2 81
Even treating piracy as simply a crime committed on the high
seas by an individual or individuals without state permission, 28 2 as
opposed to a particularly heinous crime, remarkable parallels can be
drawn to cyberterrorism. First, each is committed beyond the control
of any state, as the cyberspace easily can be analogized to the high

278.
Professor Stephen P. Marks identifies some disagreement as to whether aut
dedere aut judicare is an obligation (mandatory) or merely a right (permissive). See
Stephen P. Marks, The Hissine Habr6 Case, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL
COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra

note 247, at 131, 139 ("There is some disagreement as to whether this duty to extradite
or punish under customary international law is permissive or mandatory."). See also
Damrosch, supra note 260, at 94 ("[Alt a minimum all the prosecute-or-extradite
crimes are ones as to which there is an option to exercise jurisdiction without any link
to the crime other than custody of the offender.").
See Kontorovich, supra note 242, at 194-97 (discussing the use and
279.
necessity of the piracy analogy in the Nazi War Crimes Tribunals and the Eichmann
trial).
See id. at 196 (addressing the Israeli Supreme Court's contention that if a
280.
broader principal (such as "heinousness") could not be drawn from the example of
piracy, then Universal Jurisdiction might only be relevant to piracy).
281.
Id. at 185.
282.
See id. at 186 (arguing that piracy was not subject to universal jurisdiction
because of its heinousness); Morris, supra note 272, at 339-40 (arguing that definitions
of piracy as private activity were specifically intended to prevent universal jurisdiction
over piracy from causing international conflict).
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seas. 283 Although states have attempted to prosecute for actions
involving the Internet, 2 84 no one state controls cyberspace. Second,
each crime is committed by individuals or groups of individuals acting
without state consent. Indeed, should either piracy or cyberterrorism
be conducted by state actors, such actions would be considered acts of
aggression and, possibly, acts of war.285 Third, each threatens
international trade and the global economy. 286 Finally, each is a form
of crime meant to further the actor's agenda-for pirates, the motive
is financial; for cyberterrorists, the motive is primarily religious or
political, although it may also be financial in order to finance the
religious or political agenda. 2 87
3.

A Six-Fold Rationale

The question of whether to extend universal jurisdiction to
cyberterrorism also can be analyzed under the multiple rationales
outlined by Professor Jonathan Marks, 288 most of which support
universal jurisdiction for cyberterrorism. The rationales variously
draw from philosophy, political science, democratic theory,
international relations, and international law, in order to explain
universal jurisdiction.28 9
First, the Manichean rationale "considers the perpetrators of
serious international crimes to be enemies of all mankind by reason
of the 'heinous' crimes that they have committed." 290 This early

283.
As recognized above in supra Part V.A, there may be circumstances where
the Internet may not be considered borderless or territory-less, but those analyses do
not apply in the context of cyberterrorism.
284.
See, e.g., Yahoo! Inc. v. L.I.C.R.A., 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1194 (N.D. Cal.
2001) (granting a declaratory judgment that a French Court could not enforce its court
order that Yahoo! remove Nazi content from its auction site due to First Amendment
concerns).
285.

See JAMES A. LEWIS, ASSESSING THE RISKS OF CYBER TERRORISM, CYBER

WAR AND OTHER CYBER THREATS 3-4 (2002) (stating that cyberattacks by nation states
would almost certainly be seen as acts of war), available at http://www.steptoe.com/
publications/231a.pdf.
286.
See Traynor, supra note 13 (describing an instance in which an attack
seriously affected Estonia's banking system).
287.
See BRENNER, supra note 12, at 7, 41 (describing the motivations of such
individuals).
288.
See generally Marks, Mending the Web, supra note 248 (describing the
Manichean rationale, the common interest rationale, the agency rationale, the jus
cogens rationale, the harm rationale and the pragmatic rationale). Id. Indeed, after
describing these rationales, Marks (briefly) applies them to terrorism himself and
concludes that "many states would now consider acts of international terrorism to pose
the greatest threat to international peace and security as well as to their national
interests, and it may only be a matter of time before serious acts of international
terrorism are recognized as attracting universal jurisdiction in their own right." Id. at
471.

289.
290.

Id. at 463-71.
Id. at 463.
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rationale is based largely on piracy. The Manichean rationale for
universal jurisdiction applies to cyberterrorism because, as described
above, cyberterrorists also are perpetrators of serious international
crimes that are considered especially heinous. Furthermore, as
discussed above, one can easily draw analogies between
cyberterrorism and piracy, regardless of whether piracy originally
was considered especially heinous.
Second, the common interest rationale, based on Kant's
Perpetual Peace, 29 1 considers universal jurisdiction to be an
extension of the protective principle of prescriptive jurisdiction. 292
The protective principle enables a state to exercise jurisdiction over
crimes that are considered to threaten the state's national
interests. 293
All states have an interest in prosecuting
cyberterrorists, as cyberterrorists threaten to undermine the global
financial infrastructure and are a threat to national and international
security. Thus, each state may consider cyberterrorism as a threat to
its national interests and, therefore, exercise protective jurisdiction.
Third, the agency rationale sees the prosecuting state as acting
as the agent for the international community: "[T]he universality of
the norms violated becomes the premise for the universal nature of
the criminal jurisdiction that is being exercised." 294 There may be a
certain aspect of rationalization to this common definition of
universal jurisdiction, however. The traditional Realist school of
international relations would argue that this is merely the common
interest rationale dressed up for international acceptance, as the
state will act to protect its interests before it will be concerned with
maintaining order in international society. 295 To the extent that the
Realist school is wrong or that a state simply sees it in its interest to
maintain
order
in
international
society
by
prosecuting
cyberterrorists, the agency rationale would support the exercise of
universal jurisdiction over cyberterrorists. 296

291.
Id. at 465 ('The peoples of the earth have ... entered in varying degrees
into a universal community, and it has developed to the point where a violation of
rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere."') (quoting Immanuel Kant, Perpetual
Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, in KANT'S POLITICAL WRITINGS 107-08 (H.B. Nisbet
trans., Hans Reiss ed., 1970)).
292.
Id.
293.
Id.; see also Fry, supra note 216, at 173 (listing the protective principal as a
source of international jurisdiction); Randall, Universal Jurisdiction,supra note 216, at
787-88 (listing the protective principal as a source of international jurisdiction).
294.
Marks, Mending the Web, supra note 248, at 467.
295.

See generally HANS MORGENTHAU, KENNETH THOMPSON, & DAVID CLINTON,

POLITICS AMONG NATIONS (7th ed. 2005) (discussing different understandings of
international relations).
296.
See Marks, Mending the Web, supra note 248, at 467 ("On this view, the
universality of the norms violated becomes the premise for the universal nature of the
criminal jurisdiction that is being exercised.").
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Fourth, the jus cogens rationale Marks articulated seems to hold
simply that if an international crime violates a jus cogens norm,
universal jurisdiction exists for any state to prosecute that
violation.29 7 This analysis makes the incorrect assumption that
universal jurisdiction is available only for jus cogens violations,
however. 298 Numerous violations of international law are subject to
universal jurisdiction and are not recognized as jus cogens norms; for
example, many consider terrorism to be subject to universal
jurisdiction even though it not considered a jus cogens norm. 299
The fifth rationale, the harm rationale, provides even stronger
justification for universal jurisdiction. The harm rationale states that
"[w]hat should be of most concern is .

.

. the enormity of [the] acts,"

including the destruction of societal structures, physical and
psychological damage to victims, and the concern "that the
perpetrators of such serious international crimes may carry out such
acts again."30 0 This is essentially a version of the heinousness
analysis; as discussed above, these concerns certainly apply to
cyberterrorism, both because of the potential for serious disruption of
entire governments and world commerce, and because, as a result of
the technological methods available for covering one's tracks,
apprehension of the cyberterrorist is extremely difficult. Thus, not
only is the enormity of the acts arguably unparalleled but there is a
significant likelihood of repeat attacks.
Finally, the pragmatic rationale "asserts that universal
jurisdiction is justified when the perpetrator of the crimes would
otherwise go unpunished."3 01 This rationale is concerned with policy
considerations such as deterrence and the promotion of peace and
justice.
For the reasons described below, it is doubtful that
cyberterrorists would be prosecuted in the absence of universal
jurisdiction, as significant practical difficulties exist that essentially
bar the application of territorial jurisdiction.
Although it is
conceivable that territorial or other forms of prescriptive jurisdiction,

297.
See id. at 468 ("International Law provides that offences jus cogens may be
punished by any state because the offenders are 'common enemies of all mankind and
all nations have an equal interest in their apprehension and prosecution."') (quoting Ex
PartePinochet Ugarte (No. 3), [2002] 1 A.C. 198 (H.L. 2002)).
298.
See, e.g., Randall, Universal Jurisdiction,supra note 216, at 789 (observing
that states have recognized universal jurisdiction over some terrorist acts).
299.
See Damrosch, supra note 260, at 93 (arguing that international law has
"moved fairly far down a trajectory under which many (perhaps most or even all) forms
of terrorism now entail prosecute-or-extradite obligations" and that "many
commentators understand the category of universal jurisdiction crimes as more or less
congruent with those entailing prosecute-or-extradite obligations"); Randall, Universal
Jurisdiction,supra note 216, at 789 ("In the postwar decades, states at least impliedly
have recognized that universal jurisdiction also extends to certain terrorist acts.").
300.
Marks, Mending the Web, supra note 248, at 469.
301.
Id. at 470.
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such as protective jurisdiction, could apply, universal jurisdiction
certainly would provide the most efficient basis for prosecution.
4.

Dispelling Other Potential Concerns

Various scholars have raised a number of other concerns and
potential problems with the application or extension of universal
jurisdiction to terrorism generally or to cyberterrorism specifically.
When examined closely, however, it is apparent that there is no cause
for concern.
First is the concern that terrorism is difficult to define, and that
"one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter."3 02 This
concern is no longer valid. Rephrasing the same concept in terms of
genocide, for example-"one man's genocide is another man's ethnic
cleansing"-the absurdity of the concept is readily apparent. It is
undisputed that genocide is an international crime;30 3 the similar
classification of terrorism (and, by extension, cyberterrorism) also
should not be disputed. Furthermore, as the United Nations Security
Council stated in Resolution 1566, terrorism is "under no
circumstances justifiable
by considerations
of a political,
philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar
nature." 3 04 Thus, the old adage has outlived its usefulness; there is
no justification for terrorism or, by extension, cyberterrorism.
A second concern is that universal jurisdiction will become "a
wildfire, uncontrolled in its application and destructive of the
international legal processes."30 5 There is little chance of this,
however, primarily because determining the identity of a
cyberterrorist is exceedingly difficult. As described above, it is
extremely difficult to determine with any degree of certainty the
location from which a cyberterrorist is attacking. Add to that the
presumption that a cyberterrorist likely would execute evasive
maneuvers such as spoofing or using anonymous or masked IP
addresses, and the likelihood of identifying a cyberterrorist with any
reasonable degree of certainty drops off dramatically.

302.

United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 107 (2d Cir. 2003); see Parvez Ahmed,

Terror In the Name of Islam-Unholy War, Not Jihad,39 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 759,
764-65 (2007-2008) (arguing that even a just cause does not excuse a terrorist act, and
analyzing the common characteristics of several definitions of terrorism).
303.
See Randall, Universal Jurisdiction,supra note 216, at 834-37 (discussing
the jurisdictional justifications for prosecution of genocide, and concluding that while
the Genocide Convention only creates a territorial obligation to prosecute genocide,
customary international law creates a right to exercise universal jurisdiction over
genocide); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 278 ("[G]enocide is a crime under international law.").
304.
S.C. Res. 1566, supra note 186.
305.
Bassiouni, supra note 245, at 154.
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Furthermore, when an attack occurs, it is unclear whether it is
actually cyberterrorism or just the proverbial teenage hacker. 306 In
the Estonian cyberattack, experts were unsure whether they could
ascertain the identity (or identities) of the hacker(s) at all, much less
discover individual names.3 07 Some Estonian officials claimed that
the Russian government was responsible for the attack, but Russia
vehemently denied the allegations. 308
One individual, Dmitri
Galushkevich, was convicted and fined for an attack that blocked the
website of the Reform Party of Estonian Prime Minister Andrus
Ansip.3 0 9 Members of the Kremlin-backed youth movement Nashe
subsequently claimed responsibility for the attacks, although they
claimed that the attacks were not illegal in any way.3 10 Similarly, in
the Titan Rain incident, it was unclear whether the attacks were
initiated by the Chinese government or simply hackers using
notoriously permeable Chinese networks to disguise the origins of
their attacks.3 11
This hopping around networks is common precisely because it
helps evade detection. Cyberterrorists often use China as a jumping
off point due to its relatively lax security.3 12 This complicates efforts
to pinpoint the identity and location of attackers, as the fact that the
apparent source of an attack was a Chinese computer does not
necessarily mean that the attack actually came from China.31 3

306.
De Borchgrave, supra note 19 (quoting a Pentagon employee).
307.
See Traynor, supra note 13 ("Expert opinion is divided on whether the
identity of the cyber-warriors can be ascertained properly.").
308.
See Halpin, supra note 12 (reporting accusations from Estonian officials);
Estonia Fines Man for "Cyberwar," BBC NEWS, Jan. 25, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hiltechnology/7208511.stm ("Moscow denied any involvement.").
309.
EstoniaFines Man for "Cyberwar,"supra note 308.
310.
Charles Clover, Kremlin-Backed Group Behind Estonia Cyber Blitz, FIN.
TIMES, Mar. 11, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/57536d5a-Oddc-1lde-8ea3-0000779fd2
ac.html?nclick check=1.
311.
See Graham, supra note 166 (describing Tin Rain, and explaining that
Pentagon officials were split as to whether the attacks were originated by the Chinese
government or simply the result of the large number of vulnerable computers in
China). Such was also the case with respect to foreign utilities that were hacked in
2008. See Ellen Nakashima & Steven Mufson, Hackers Have Attacked Foreign Utilities,
CIA Analyst Says, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 2008, at A4, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/18/AR2008011803277.html
(noting that "cyber attackers have hacked into the computer systems of utility
companies outside the United States and made demands, in at least one case causing a
power outage that affected multiple cities" and, quoting a top CIA cybersecurity
official, "'We do not know who executed these attacks or why, but all involved
intrusions through the Internet"').
312.
See Graham, supra note 166 (noting that hackers might employ the large
number of vulnerable computers in China to launch attacks).
313.
See id.
Pentagon figures show that more attempts to scan Defense Department
systems come from China, which has 119 million Internet users, than from any
other country. [Lieutenant Colonel Mike VanPutte, Vice Director of Operations
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Although this presents a practical difficulty to exercising
universal jurisdiction, 314 the difficulty of determining the identity (or
identities) of the cyberterrorist(s) must be overcome before any
prescriptive jurisdiction can be claimed, including territorial
jurisdiction. This simple reality of criminal prosecution is inherently
complicated due to the technical realities of cyberspace.
Others dispute that universal jurisdiction should be applied to a
greater variety of violations of international law, citing concerns that
prosecution may be arbitrary and that there is no consideration of
sovereign immunity. 315
The trend of recognizing universal
jurisdiction over terrorism continues despite those critiques, however,
and with good reason: there are clear analogies between the (once)
ancient crime of piracy and the more recently recognized crimes of
genocide, crimes against humanity, and terrorism and, most
importantly, there are clear analogies to be drawn between each of
the aforementioned crimes and the twenty-first century crime of
cyberterrorism.
The application of universal jurisdiction to cyberterrorism fits
within the natural evolution of international criminal law and is a
logical and measured response to the threat to international peace
and security posed by cyberterrorism. Although the authors of the
2001 Princeton Principles considered adding terrorism to the list of
crimes subject to universal jurisdiction but ultimately did not, they
nonetheless explicitly recognized that the list is neither exhaustive
nor static. 3 16 Furthermore, the world has changed since then. In the

for the U.S. Strategic Command Joint Task Force for Global Network
Operations] said this does not mean that China is where all the probes start,
only that it is 'the last hop' before they reach their targets. He noted that China
is a convenient 'steppingstone' for hackers because of the large number of
computers there that can be compromised. Also, tracing hackers who use
Chinese networks is complicated by the lack of cyber investigation agreements
between China and the United States, another task force official said.
314.
Professor Kenneth C. Randall suggests that "[p]erhaps the most serious
obstacle to exercising universal jurisdiction comes in the form of international politics."
Kenneth C. Randall, Book Review, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 293, 297 (2005) (reviewing
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS
CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 247). Although international politics

can complicate the exercise of universal jurisdiction, and may in other circumstances
pose the largest difficulty, the territory-less nature of cyberspace poses the largest
obstacle for exercising universal jurisdiction over cyberterrorists.
315.
See, e.g., Henry Kissinger, The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction,FOR. AFF.,
July-Aug. 2001, at 86, 86 (expressing fears of "substituting the tyranny of judges for
that of governments"); see also Marks, Mending the Web, supra note 248, at 471-75
(describing various objections to universal jurisdiction). But see Kenneth Roth, The
Case for Universal Jurisdiction,FOR. AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2001, at 150, 153 (recognizing
that Kissinger's concerns are legitimate but stating that in certain respects they may
be "overblown").
316.
The list is described as "explicitly illustrative, not exhaustive. Principle 2(1)
leaves open the possibility that, in the future, other crimes may be deemed of such a
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intervening eight years, the world has seen an exponential increase
in terrorist activity and a parallel exponential increase in dependence
on the Internet.3 1 7 Modern states should recognize these realities
and their attendant implications.
Some contest this conclusion and argue against looking to
universal jurisdiction so quickly. Professor Abu-Odeh argues that
universal jurisdiction should not be recognized as a binding principle
of international law because it would be disproportionately enforced
and therefore have disproportionate effects both on those prosecuted
under a theory of universal jurisdiction and on the balance of power
in the world.31 8 Professor Abu-Odeh presents this argument by
assessing three questions: (1) "[T]he judges of which countries are
more likely to exercise jurisdiction over such cases?" (2) "[W]hat kind
of crimes are more likely to be deemed 'heinous' by those judges?" and
(3) "[W]hat would be the effect of those judges' decisions on the
overall balance of power in the world?"319 Although his is a cogent
argument, a fair question he does not present is, "What would happen
if international crimes were not prosecuted?"
Indeed, Professor Abu-Odeh's critique of universal jurisdiction
arguably applies to all international law. Regardless of the theory of
jurisdiction, states ultimately choose whether or not to prosecute.
The potential biases that Professor Abu-Odeh identifies in states'
determination of whether to prosecute and what crimes to prosecute,
to the extent that they exist, apply equally to all forms of jurisdiction
under international law.
Returning to the unasked question, the answer is that if
international crimes are not prosecuted, international criminals like
cyberterrorists will flourish undeterred, secure in the knowledge that
they can commit the most heinous act imaginable without even the
Although prosecution of
possibility of being held accountable.
cyberterrorism is imperfect, a complete lack of prosecution is not a
tenable option.

heinous nature as to warrant the application of universal jurisdiction." Becker, supra
note 243, at 1375.

317.

See Internet Growth Cooling, but Dependence Increasing-Survey, AFX

http://www.forbes.com/feeds/afx/2006/03/29/
2006,
Mar.
29,
LIMITED,
NEWS
afx2632297.html (reporting an international study which found an increase in
dependence on the Internet); see, e.g., Timothy Williams, Iraq Bombings, Deadliest
Since 2007, Raise Security Issue, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 25, 2009, at Al, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/26/world/middleeast/26iraq.html? r=1&hp (describing
a violent contemporary bombing in Baghdad, as well as past terrorist attacks in Iraq).
Lama Abu-Odeh, A Radical Rejection of Universal Jurisdiction,116 YALE
318.
L.J. (POCKET PART) 393 (2007).
Id.
319.
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VI. CONCLUSION

Cyberterrorism poses perhaps the greatest threat to national
and international security since the creation of weapons of mass
destruction. As states and their economies become increasingly
intertwined, largely due to the Internet and the international
financial system of global trade, the effects of a cyberterrorist attack
will be greater. Similarly, as cyberterrorists gain experience in
disrupting national governments and shutting down critical
infrastructure, their attacks likely will become increasingly
successful. Although states, private industry, and international
organizations have made significant efforts to increase international
cooperation, much more needs to be done. In taking action, however,
it must be understood that, due to the fundamental weakness of the
structure of the Internet, those additional efforts will not completely
prevent cyberterrorism. As a result, further efforts at international
cooperation and international standards must be part of a layered
approach to cyberterrorism that also includes deterrence.
As a result of the realities inherent to cyberspace, the most
feasible way to deter cyberterrorism is through the international law
principle of universal jurisdiction. This is not to say that territorial
jurisdiction (or nationality, passive personality, or protective
jurisdiction) could not be used to prosecute cyberterrorists, should
there be sufficient information and state willingness to exercise other
forms of jurisdiction. It is merely to say that universal jurisdiction is
likely to be the most feasible manner of prosecution and, therefore,
deterrence. A layered approach of mitigation and deterrence can
reduce the threat of cyberterrorism substantially. Unless and until
states are willing to exercise universal jurisdiction over cyberterrorist
acts as part of that layered approach, however, it is only a matter of
time before cyberterrorists are able to unleash a cyber-apocalypse.

